Reference history of Pingxingguan victory

Pingxingguan Dajie

In 1937, the National Government organized the Battle of Taiyuan, and Lin Biao and Nie Rongzhen led the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army to participate in the battle in Shanxi. The 115th Division used the favorable terrain of Pingxingguan to ambush the Japanese army on September 25, annihilated more than 1,000 Japanese Itagaki Division, seized a large number of military supplies, and achieved the Pingxingguan victory. This was the first great victory for the Chinese army since the War of Resistance Against Japan, crushed the myth of the invincible Japanese army, destroyed the Japanese military plan to directly take Taiyuan, supported the Xinkou Battle that the GMD army was preparing, and inspired the people's confidence in the victory of the War of Resistance.

The Pingxingguan victory was the first victory of the Eighth Route Army after it stepped out of the Anti-Japanese War in North China, which inspired the morale of the people across the country.

Introduction to the Pingxingguan Battle

When the Eighth Route Army was in Shanxi, the 5th Division of Itagaki Seishiro (Nine Brigade) of the Japanese army, with the cooperation of the Chahar Expedition Army (Highji Tojo), was attacking the Great Wall along the Pingsui Road, attempting to go south to attack Taiyuan, seize the hinterland of Shanxi, and cooperate with the North China Front Army's operations on Pinghan Road from the right wing. China's 2nd War Zone formulated a combat plan to block the Japanese army along the passes of the Great Wall. In the Pingxingguan aspect, it was determined to gather heavy troops to annihilate the invading enemies, and requested the Eighth Route Army to cooperate in the side attack of the Japanese army. In order to cooperate with friendly forces to defend Shanxi, and boost the power of the Eighth Route Army, the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army successfully carried out the Pingxingguan ambush and achieved a great victory in the first battle.

In early September 1937, according to the Pingxingguan combat plan formulated by the Jin army, the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army drove to the vicinity of Pingxingguan. Pingxingguan is located in the northeast of Shanxi Province and is a throat road in northeastern Shanxi Province. It has peaks and steep and steep on both sides. There are commanding heights such as Dongpaochi and Laoyemiao on the left, and Baiyatai on the right. In front of the pass, it is a narrow channel extending from southwest to northeast, which is an ideal place to ambush and annihilate the enemy. On the 2nd, part of the 21st Brigade of the Fifth Division of the Japanese Army attacked from Lingqiu to Pingxingguan and occupied the Dongpaochi area. On the 23rd, the 115th Division was determined to seize the weakness of the Japanese army's arrogance and neglecting guards, and used the favorable terrain in northeastern Pingxingguan to annihilate the enemy by ambushing, and held a meeting of cadres above the company to conduct in-depth combat mobilization. Late at night on the 24th, the 115th Division took advantage of the darkness.

At night and heavy rain, secretly entered the pre-set combat positions such as Baiyatai. At dawn on the 25th, the follow-up troops of the 21st Brigade of the 5th Division of the Japanese Army took more than 100 cars and more than 200 large trucks with supplies. They advanced from east to west along the Lingqiu-Pingxingguan Highway. At about 7 o'clock, all of the units entered the pre-accident position of the 115th Division. The 115th Division seized the fighter jet and immediately ordered the entire line to open fire. Taking advantage of the moment of chaos, they launched an attack. Part of the 115th Division annihilated the enemy's vanguard and blocked the way south along the highway; part of the troops surrounded the Japanese rear-end troops and cut off their retreat; part of the troops rushed across the highway and quickly seized Laoye Temple and the highland north of it; part of the troops blocked the Japanese army's early occupation of Dongpaochi to return to aid; part of the troops sent by the Japanese Fifth Division. After fierce battles, they wiped out the besieged Japanese troops and won a great victory.

This battle achieved great results. The 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army killed more than 1,000 Japanese troops, destroyed more than 100 cars, more than 200 carriages, seized more than 1,000 rifles, more than 20 machine guns, a cannon, and a large number of military supplies, achieving the first great victory of the Chinese army since the beginning of the national war of resistance.

The Pingxingguan victory was in a situation where the Japanese army advanced straight in and the GMD army retreated step by step, effectively hit the crazy arrogance of the Japanese army, breaking the myth of invincibility of the Japanese army, and allowing the people of the whole country to see the hope of the Chinese nation, thus greatly encouraging the people's hearts, morale and news spread. Everyone in the country was excited and sent congratulatory messages, greatly improving the prestige of GCCD and the Eighth Route Army. At the same time, in the entire strategy, it won preparation time for the Xinkou operation, effectively suppressed the actions of the 5th Division of the Japanese army, and supported the operations of Pinghan Road from the flank. (Contributed by the Memorial Hall of the Chinese People's Anti-Japanese War)

The detailed battle of Pingxingguan

Pingxingguan Battle, also known as Pingxingguan Battle, was a great victory in Pingxingguan, a battle that caused a sensation in the whole country during the War of Resistance Against Japan. However, for a long time, some people have little understanding of the specific situation of this battle, and even have some incorrect understandings. Therefore, it is necessary to clarify some facts.

The Pingxingguan battle is an integral part of the Pingxingguan battle. It was proposed by the Jinsui Army, and Zhou Enlai and Peng Dehuai, who were responsible for contacting the Eighth Route Army, and Lin Biao was specifically deployed and commanded by Zhu De, the headquarters of the Eighth Route Army.

After the outbreak of the War of Resistance in 1937, the Kuomintang and the Communist Party achieved the second cooperation. The Workers and Peasants' Red Army led by the Communist Party of China was reorganized into the Eighth Route Army in late August and quickly stepped out of the Shanxi Anti-Japanese Front. At the same time, the leaders of the Communist Party of China, Zhou Enlai, Peng Dehuai and others entered Shanxi first and negotiated with Yan Xishan, the commander-in-chief of the Second War Zone of GMD, who ruled Shanxi, to jointly fight against Japan. At this time, the Japanese invading army had already advanced into Jin, and Yan Xishan wanted to rely on the Eighth Route Army. Therefore, the two sides quickly reached an agreement to use the tactics of mobile warfare and guerrilla warfare to attack the Japanese army and cooperate with friendly forces.

In late September, when the Eighth Route Army set off, the main leaders of Zhu De, Peng Dehuai, Ren Bishi, Zuo Quan and others gathered together. On September 21, the Front Branch of the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China held a meeting to discuss the situation of Shanxi and the Eighth Route Army's combat plan. Peng Dehuai explained at the meeting that his friendly forces requested to attack the enemy in Pingxingguan, which was unanimously agreed by the participants. Based on this, the Eighth Route Army headquarters formulated a combat training order. On September 23, Zhu De and Peng Dehuai issued the "115th Division" to the 115th Division.

The division should immediately go to Pingxingguan, Lingqiu, and maneuver to attack the enemy on Pingxingguan." At the same time, the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army, as an advance force, went to Pingxingguan near Pingxingguan in late September. After following the vanguard, Lin Biao, who was advancing near Pingxingguan, reached the terrain and analyzed the enemy situation, also proposed to the Eighth Route Army Headquarters and Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China to concentrate troops to fight a battle.

Pingxingguan battle was specifically commanded by Lin Biao. During the Pingxingguan battle, Lin Biao surveyed the terrain of Pingxingguan several times, chose the battlefield where the Japanese army had to pass and was very suitable for ambush battles. He formulated two regiments to intercept and divide the enemy in progress, and used one regiment to cut off the enemy's retreat route. An independent regiment and a cavalry battalion blocked the enemy's reinforcements. He used one regiment as a reserve to maneuver the battle on the spot. During the battle, he broke through the original plan to use a brigade.

In fact, the entire division's troops were used. This was a change based on actual conditions, and it also reflected his desire to fight a big battle and achieve major results. Adapting to changes is something that often happens in military command, so it should be allowed. This change had a positive effect on the victory of the Pingxingguan battle. In short, the victory of the Pingxingguan battle was the result of the bloody battle of all the commanders and fighters of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army, and it was inseparable from Lin Biao's command.

As mentioned earlier, although the Pingxingguan battle was carried out under the framework of the combat plan of Yan Xishan, the Eighth Route Army carried out independently. The cooperation between guerrilla warfare and mobile warfare in enemy rear was proposed by Zhu De at the Nanjing Military Conference, and the Eighth Route Army's implementation of independent guerrilla warfare and mobile warfare in enemy rear was the basic content of this agreement. The Eighth Route Army adhered to this principle in the Pingxingguan battle. The plan, deployment, use of troops and the progress of the Pingxingguan battle were all undertaken by the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army. During the battle, there was no GMD army participating in the battle, nor did the GMD army restrain the Japanese army. It was originally supposed to be the GMD army, but when the Eighth Route Army started at Pingxingguan, it did not cooperate. The 115th Division had sent people to contact the nearby GMD army several times, but they all

There was no result. After the Pingxingguan battle, according to the agreement with the GMD army, the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army immediately rushed towards the Japanese army in Dongpaochi, facing Pingxingguan, and seized the highlands around Dongpaochi at dusk that day and surrounded the Japanese army in the basin of the Dongpaochi area. However, the GMD army did not attack as planned. Yang Dezhi, who was the leader of the 685th Regiment of the 343 Brigade, recalled: According to the scheduled plan, the GMD army should attack at the same time as us. After we eliminated the enemies on the road, we turned to Dongpaochi and cooperated with them to destroy the wall division. Unexpectedly, we and our brother team ran to Dongpaochi to surround the enemy, but there was no sign of a GMD soldier. It turned out that they did not attack at all. The lazy battle of the GMD army caused the Japanese army in the area to be annihilated, and the results of the Pingxingguan battle were not expanded.

The impact of Pingxingguan victory

Pingxingguan battle was the first great victory for the Chinese Communist Party and army since the national war of resistance, with far-reaching influence. Pingxingguan battle eliminated more than 1,000 Japanese troops. Judging from the history of the entire War of Resistance Against Japan, it was not a big battle, but it shocked the whole country and had far-reaching significance. First, since the War of Resistance Against Japan, the Chinese army fought bravely, but did not achieve good results. At that time, the Battle of Songhu on the southern line was in a stalemate, and the Chinese army suffered serious casualties. The large tracts of land in the northern section of Jinpu Road were quickly lost, and Yan Xishan's Jin army also lost territory continuously. Pingxingguan battle cleanly eliminated more than a thousand Japanese troops.

It was the first great victory for the Chinese army since the national war of resistance. Therefore, the gmd government said: "This is an unprecedented victory for the Chinese army on the Pingsui Line." It gave a heavy blow to the Japanese army that rushed forward since the invasion of China, especially because it was the Japanese ace division, so this blow was particularly heavy for the Japanese army and was particularly meaningful. And its more important significance was that it greatly encouraged the fighting spirit of the people of the whole country. As Xu Fanting, then chairman of the battlefield mobilization committee of the Second Gmd War Zone, pointed out: The special significance of the Pingxingguan battle "is to break the invincible myth of the 'Imperial Army' and to increase our morale." Second, the painful blow to the Japanese army by the Pingxingguan battle not only broke the Japanese breakthrough

Pingxingguan, attacking the troops of the Second War Zone of China, cooperated with the strategic attempt of the Japanese army to fight on Pinghan Road from the right wing, and further slammed the Japanese army's offensive momentum into the heart of Shanxi, and damaged the Japanese army's spirit and made them dare not go rashly, providing an opportunity for China to deploy the Xinkou Battle, thus effectively supporting the war of resistance of the Chinese front army. Third, the Eighth Route Army took the initiative to fight against the Japanese army's main division with weapons that were far inferior to the GMD army, and used weapons that even civilian armed forces at that time, and won a great victory in the first battle, highlighting the combat effectiveness of the Eighth Route Army, thus greatly improving the prestige of the Eighth Route Army and improving the Chinese Communist Party.

26. The prestige of the Party. Fourth, the Pingxingguan battle enhanced the understanding of the Chinese Communist Party leaders' understanding of the laws of the war against Japan. Based on the experience of Pingxingguan battle, Mao Zedong further proposed the Eighth Route Army's combat policy on September 29, 1937: "The fundamental policy is to win over the masses and organize the guerrillas of the masses. Under this general policy, implement conditional concentrated combat." Soon, he summarized it as "independent guerrilla warfare and mobile warfare", thus improving our party's combat guiding ideology for leading the Anti-Japanese War.

It should be noted that the Pingxingguan victory was a very small victory from any angle. It was a second-rate Japanese baggage force, but it still killed 10,000 enemies and lost 8,000 to itself. However, the historical significance of this war cannot be underestimated. Because since the war between China and Japan began, China has not yet achieved a victory, even such a small ambush. Therefore, after this battle, both the Eighth Route Army and the GMD side consciously expanded its influence and exaggerated its achievements in order to maximize the anti-Japanese morale of the Chinese military and civilians, break the myth of the invincible Japanese army, and remove the deep-rooted Japanese war fear and war-afraid of the army. Therefore, as the first victory in the anti-Japanese war, this battle still has a huge historical role.

Note: Pingxingguan Victory and Pingxingguan Battle are two concepts that are often confused but completely different. Pingxingguan Battle is a defensive battle between our Shanxi Sui Army and our Shanxi Sui Army in the depths of the Pingxingguan area. It is a major battle in the Taiyuan Battle. This battle was ultimately defeated by the Japanese army breaking through the Pingxingguan Pass. Pingxingguan Battle refers to a short-term small-scale ambush battle carried out by our Eighth Route Army to cooperate with the Pingxingguan Battle of the Jinsui Army. The battlefield range is in the Qiaogou west of Pingxingguan and Zhumaling area in the direction of Guangling. The battle successfully ambushed the Japanese army trying to pass through Pingxingguan, and wiped out about 1,000 Japanese 21st Brigade baggage units, and the Eighth Route Army suffered more than 600 casualties, becoming a victory for the Chinese army to fight against Japan since the outbreak of the full-scale war of resistance.

Analysis of Pingxingguan Victory

Chinese information

The Battle of Pingxingguan broke out on September 25, 1937. The next day, on the morning of September 26, Mao Zedong immediately drafted an exaggerated propaganda report, and called the Military Commission of the National Government in the name of the Eighth Route Army Staff Office to report the victory. Major newspapers across the country published it, such as: "On September 25, our Eighth Route Army fought fiercely with more than 10,000 enemies at Xingguan in Beiping, Shanxi.

, repeatedly charged, our army was unable to move forward, defeating all the attacking enemies. All positions in Xinzhuang, Guansha and Dongpaochi north of Pingxingguan were completely captured. The enemy officers and soldiers were killed, with corpses across the mountains and fields, and one was captured and disarmed, and many cars, tanks, guns and other military supplies were seized. The remaining enemies are now retreating to Xiaosai Village, and I am surrounded on all sides. Eighth Route Army Staff Office. Yu (Note: September 26).

At 11:00 noon on the 26th, Mao Zedong stated in a telegram to Zhu De, Peng Dehuai and others: "The Eighth Route Army General Staff Office has used cables, and the radio has sent a simple good news, saying that more than 10,000 enemies have been defeated, and many of them have been killed. A group of prisoners, many vehicles, guns and cannons have been seized. The investigation is a medium term." Mao also proposed: "The number of seized cannot be exaggerated to GMD, but the number of external propaganda can be slightly increased. Can it be said that more than 1,000 prisoners, more than 80 cars, five tanks, three cannons, and three thousand shells are captured, please make a decision and be unified." ("Mao Jingdong sent Zhu Pengren and reported to Lin Nie" on September 26, 1937).

Because Zhu and Peng had reported the results of the battle at this time, the content was still "the seizure of more than 60 cars, three motorcycles, one external cannon, and more than 2,000 shells", "The captive of more than 300 enemy officers and soldiers, and there were about four or five hundred enemy soldiers, and dozens of horses were completely surrounded by me, and they did not disarm, so they all killed them." Therefore, they expanded the number of attacks on Mao Zedong to more than 10,000, and claimed that more than 1,000 prisoners were captured, and they obviously thought it was inappropriate. After receiving the phone, Zhu and Peng jointly replied that night, "We do not need to expand our opinions on yesterday's victory against GMD, and we should promote it to the public. It is better to call us Jiang Yan to send telegrams today." ("Zhu Peng to Mao Zedong and Lin Nie" on September 26, 1937).

However, as Mao Dian has already mentioned, the good news he had prepared had been issued, but because the seizure problem had to be unified with the front, he sent a call to Zhu and Peng to discuss it. This statement was difficult to recover. As a result, in the telegram to the Nanjing authorities that day, there were two Pingxingguan battle news with very different contents from Yan'an and the former general. However, the Central Committee and even the newspapers of all parties naturally took Mao's good news from Zedong as the basis. The so-called Pingxingguan annihilated more than 10,000 enemies in one battle, which came from this.

The book "The Eighth Route Army" published by the Anti-Japanese War Press belonging to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on November 20, 1937 was reported as follows: "On the 25th, the 10th and 22nd Regiments of the famous Itagaki Division entered the Pingxingguan war. Our army captured more than 1,000 enemies, and the enemy suffered more than 5,000 casualties. Our army captured tanks, armored vehicles and horse-drawn carts in total."

The mainland history books before the 1980s changed the number of annihilated enemies to 3,000. The general description is: "On September 25, it was dim and the troops of the Japanese army attacking Pingxingguan were vaguely visible. At this time, the 21st Brigade of the 5th Division of Itagaki had about 4,000 people, more than 100 cars, and more than 200 large cars, and the battle began. In this battle, more than 3,000 Japanese troops were annihilated, more than 100 cars and 20 large cars were destroyed, and a Type 93 field cannon, more than 20 light and heavy machine guns, more than 1,000 rifles, more than 20 grenade launchers, fifty-three war horses, 300,000 Japanese yen, more than 15,000 cotton coats, and countless other military foods. Japanese coats alone were enough for each person of the 115th Division. Our army suffered nearly a thousand casualties."

After the mid-1990s, the number of enemies was wiped out to one thousand: "In this battle, the 115th Division killed more than 1,000 people from the 21st Brigade of the 5th Division of the Japanese army, destroyed more than 100 cars and more than 200 carriages, seized more than 1,000 rifles, more than 20 machine guns, 1 artillery, and a large number of military supplies." (Written by the Military History Research Department of the Academy of Military Sciences: "History of the Chinese War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression", Volume 1994 edition, pages 39-40).

From this we can see that the number of enemies annihilated in Pingxingguan battles has gradually shrunk, and there are several major modifications: the annihilated Japanese troops changed from the "main force of the 21st Brigade" to the "third battalion and baggage unit of the 21st Regiment of the 21st Brigade". The losses of the Japanese army ranged from "fighting fiercely with more than 10,000 enemies", "more than 5,000 enemy casualties", to "annihilation of 3,000 enemies, destroyed more than 100 cars, and destroyed more than 200 large cars" to "annihilation of more than 1,000 enemies, seized more than 1,000 rifles, and destroyed more than 100 cars". In some works in the 1990s, the number of enemies annihilated was changed to more than 500 people and 600 people.

Japanese information

However, according to Japanese historical research, in the Pingxingguan battle, the Eighth Route Army annihilated the Japanese army was the logistics unit of the 5th Division (the Japanese army called the baggage and troop station troops), killing less than 200 Japanese troops, including two Zhongsou.

According to Japanese historical records, in the Pingxingguan battle, the 5th Division of the Japanese army was ambushed by a squadron of the troop station and a squadron of the 21st Regiment heading to the front line, as well as a "big luggage" of the 21st Regiment heading to the front line and a squadron of the guards (The History Room of the Defense Research Institute of the Japan Defense Department: "History of the Army's Operations in the Chinese Incident", Volume 1, Volume 2, page 52). Therefore, in the Pingxingguan battle, the Eighth Route Army ambushed the Japanese army small troops advancing against each other! The two Japanese troops entered the encirclement at the same time and were surrounded by the Eighth Route Army respectively. The weaker one was completely wiped out, and the other was severely damaged.

According to the book "Sino-Japanese War" written by Katsumi Usui (May 25, 1967, printed by the Central Public Discussion Society), Volume 13, page 120: "The 21st Brigade of the Japanese Army stationed in Lingqiu received a report that the rain and cold in the 21st Regiment was urgently needed, and ordered the 21st Regiment's logistics team (large luggage team) to have 50 horses and 70 large carts, full of clothes, food and ammunition, and were traveling to the Pacific Passenger Passenger. This logistics team was led by Lieutenant Yoshio Takahashi, the 3rd team leader of the 12th Squadron, with 15 baggage troops and 70 spies guarding him; in front of the logistics team, there were small intelligence staff of the 5th Division, Shin-masachi Hashimoto Shin-chan Command, the small team of the Sae-chan Commander of the 5th Division. Charcoal cars traveled together... At this moment, the 6th station team of the Japanese army led by Jun Nakasa Shinjo, led by Captain Toshihiko Yashima, 176 people from the 2nd Squadron, 50 Nissan trucks in front, and the eighth Grandmaster of the Chinese and Western order led 30 trucks in the back, and set out from Guangou to the east. Jun Nakagou took 6 trucks and 15 soldiers, walking at the forefront of the team (the convoy had a total of 81 trucks). These two non-combat troops, the baggage team from Lingqiu to the west, and the car team from Guangou to the east, entered the ambush trap of the 115th Division after 10:00 on the 25th...."

Therefore, the Japanese army entering the ambush circle came from two entrances and belonged to two units! One was the 6th Army Station Bus Team that returned to Lingqiu from Pingxingguan. It is clearly recorded that Jun Shinjo and his entourages were 22, and the 2nd Squadron led by Captain Yajima Toshihiko, totaling 176 people, totaling 198 people. So, how many people are there in the 3rd Squadron of the Eighth Major of the Nakamoto? Judging from the 30 trucks he was riding, the famous scholar Yang Kuisong believes that there were about 110 people. So, this The Japanese army should have more than 300 people, with a total of 81 cars, entering the Eighth Route Army ambush area from west to east. The commander of this unit was Shinzhuang Junakazusa; the second was the 21st infantry registrar unit (large luggage team) that carried a large number of ammunition, clothing, food and other materials from Lingqiu to Pingxingguan front line, with 86 people and 70 large cars, led by Shunmasa Hashimoto. Both Japanese troops were at the forefront as commanders, so these two at the forefront were killed first.

The Japanese army on the slippery path after the rain was inconvenient and the cart could not be moved. The Japanese army dismounted and pushed the cart one after another. At this time, the Eighth Route Army launched a fierce attack. According to the "Sino-Japan Death Battle on the Mainland Stage" written by the former Japanese "Daily News" reporter Masahiro (serialized in Maru Magazine): "Lin Biao's troops were waiting for ambush on the cliffs on both sides of the road. After the attack was launched, grenades and rifles were fired at the same time. The unarmed but mostly horse-ridden luggage was first hit and destroyed. Staff Hashimoto, Lieutenant Takahashi and other commanded the guards to fight, but all the members died in battle."

All 86 Japanese soldiers from the large luggage team on Hashimoto's route were shot dead. The problem is that the "big luggage" of the 21st Regiment. According to some people, the large luggage is an independent unit of the Japanese army, equivalent to a military station (the Japanese military brigade only has a military station, and the wing only has large luggage), with a unit of about 100 people, mainly logistics civilian personnel. In this way, the Japanese army had nearly 200 people instead of 86 people on Hashimoto's route. However, according to netizens "Sasu" and other research, the personnel of this "big luggage" were called "loot objects" in Japanese historical materials, which were insulting and should not refer to the Japanese army. I think that according to Japanese historical materials, in addition to the Japanese army, there were more than 300 Korean workers who were ambushed at Pingxingguan (the Japanese army generally used Korean labor work and logistics transportation work during World War II, and mentioned in all the battles of the Pacific War. ), the Japanese military history also said that the Japanese army had civilians and were not equipped with weapons (Hamada United History, pages 97-106). Some people also thought that it was impossible for the Japanese army to drive 70 large chariots on this route, which was suspected to be a mistake of 150 people. The famous scholar Yang Kuisong also held this view. However, it has been explained above that the people who drove the car should be Korean workers. In addition to these more than 300 Korean workers, there should be more than 400 Japanese soldiers on this route, all of which were shot dead. According to Zhu De and Peng Dehuai's telegram to Chiang Kai-shek in Nanjing the next day, it was: "There is another telegram about four or five hundred people, and dozens of horses were completely surrounded by me, and I did not surrender my gun, so all were killed" ("Zhu Peng's telegram to Nanjing Grand Marshal Jiang on the Great Victory of the Pingxingguan Campaign" on September 26, 1937, Archives of the History of the Military Order of the National Government (25) 3081).

The Japanese army coming from Pingxingguan on Xinzhuang was obviously beyond the expectations of the 115th Division. We can also get some evidence from the memories of Li Tianyou, the commander of the 686th Regiment of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army who was commanding the battle at that time. He mentioned that the ambushed Japanese army was not just troops coming from Lingqiu West, but also convoys coming from Pingxingguan East. At his position at that time, he had seen "a car that opened from Pingxingguan to fire" (Li Tianyou: "First Battle with Pingxingguan", published in "Eighth Route Army (Memories and Historical Materials)", PLA Publishing House, 1998 edition, page 209). Xinzhuang Chunzhongzuo was the first to be hit. He was shot dead, but considering that the captains of Yajima and the Chinese and Western squadrons of the Japanese 6th Army Station were both attacked and had to escape, and there was a very detailed report about being imprisoned and breaking through, it is believed that one of the Japanese Xinzhuang motor team members did rush out of the encirclement. According to the book "Sino-Japanese War" written by Katsumi Usui, "At the end of the war in the afternoon, the Japanese 6th Army Station team lost 75 trucks, and the commander Jun Shinzhuang was killed in battle, and 34 were injured." Because the number of Japanese troops on the Xinzhuang road was large, the combat effectiveness was strong, and beyond the expectations of the Eighth Route Army, they were able to escape from the ambush circle, avoiding the misfortune of being completely wiped out.

To sum up, the Japanese army that was ambushed by the Eighth Route Army in Pingxingguan were mainly Japanese baggage teams and automobile teams, not combat units. Regarding this point, there is a clear statement on the battle report of the 685th Regiment of the 115th Division that participated in the battle. It pointed out: "The enemy's combat troops participated in this battle were the loser teams of the 21st Brigade (20th Regiment of the 19th Regiment) of the Fifth Division and a few mechanical convoys, all under the command of the 21st Brigade Commander." ("("(685th Regiment)" , October 12, 1937). However, it should be seen that the Eighth Route Army also carried out a blocking operation for a considerable period of time (not annihilation or ambush). The target of the combat was the Japanese combat troops, that is, the 3rd Battalion of the 21st Regiment of the 21st Brigade of the 5th Division of the Japanese Army, who came to rescue. At around 11 a.m. on the day of the battle, the 3rd Battalion of the Japanese Army, who was in charge of the frontal offensive operations of Pingxingguan, had learned that the car team was ambushed and immediately dispatched nearly three squadrons, including the main force of the machine gun squadron, to rescue, but was blocked by the Eighth Route Army (see the 21st Club: "Hamda Federation History", Japan (not seen in publishing unit) 1973 January edition, pages 97-104; Kojima Yoshima: "Japan-Sino War", Japanese Literature and Art Spring and Autumn Society, 1984 edition, pages 122-125). Therefore, the Eighth Route Army's targets this battle not only included Japanese field troops, but also had quite strong automatic firearm troops. It is not an exaggeration to say that there was the 3rd battalion among the Japanese troops fighting with them. But generally speaking, the Eighth Route Army annihilated "the third battalion of the 21st Regiment and the part of the baggage unit" in the Pingxingguan battle, which easily gave people the impression that the Eighth Route Army mainly annihilated the Japanese combat troops, but this is not accurate, because the Third Battalion is a rescue force and is not in the ambush circle, and the only ones who were ambushed were the Japanese baggage unit.

The number of Japanese soldiers killed in the Pingxingguan battle was 129 (86 people in Hashimoto's 1st Route and 43 people in Xinzhuang's 1st Route), and the 3rd Japanese army that rescued the siege. On September 25, a total of 98 casualties (38 people died and 60 injured, see "Handa United History", pages 115-117). Since the 3rd Battalion did not fight fiercely with the GMD army that day, the numbers can be counted as all the losses of the Pingxingguan rescue war. In this way, the Japanese army died in the Pingxingguan battle, and 94 injured (261 people in total) , In other words, the number of Japanese troops killed less than 200. Since the 1990s, some works in the mainland claimed that the Pingxingguan battle annihilated 500-600 Japanese troops, which included more than 300 Korean workers, but I think Korean workers should not be included in the results. According to the authoritative war history experts of the People's Liberation Army, the Eighth Route Army carried out ambush condescendingly in this battle, but 800 casualties were mostly old backbones who passed the Long March. In this battle, the Eighth Route Army suffered roughly three times the number of casualties of the Japanese army, and the proportion of casualties of cadres was particularly large.

Therefore, in the Pingxingguan battle, the Eighth Route Army killed less than 200 Japanese troops, and not many were seized. Five years after the battle, on December 18, 1942, Peng Dehuai (who replaced Yang Shangkun as secretary of the Northern Bureau of the Communist Party Central Committee) made a "Report on the Work of the North China Base Area" at the meeting of cadres at the battalion and county level in Taihang District. He said: "About mass guerrilla warfare, it is from Pingxingguan warfare.

After the fight, we realized its importance even more. Pingxingguan was a complete ambush, which the enemy had never expected before, but as a result, we were unable to capture a living Japanese soldier and only saved up a complete rifle of less than 100." (8226; The Party publication "Truth" Issue 14, published by the Propaganda Department of the Central China Bureau of the Communist Party of China on August 20, 1943). Based on this, the original saying "more than a thousand rifles were seized" was exaggerated by ten times.
Chapter completed!