Also located in the Sound and Shadow area, the 1,650 soldiers of Benjamin Reeves' 1st Cavalry Regiment under William Schlacker were also caught off guard. Their camp was located 300 yards south of Bloody Mountain Peak, the westernmost point of the Confederate army.
By coincidence, the instructor of this regiment was involved in the battle at the southern mouth of Bloody Mountain for unknown reasons. He hurried back to inform his regiment that the enemy was coming. Although it was unbelievable, Reeves sent 20 people to investigate and ordered the remaining
The troops spread out in horizontal formation.
The horses were guarded six to one instead of the normal four to one, and then the reconnaissance troops returned to confirm the enemy's arrival, and soon after, Federal troops also swarmed up the hill.
Andrews's 1st Missouri Infantry on the right flank of the line turned to Reeves's mounted troops to engage the enemy, creating a 60-yard gap with the 1st Kansas Infantry, but Totten's artillery quickly filled the gap.
After a round of Confederate fire with poor accuracy, Reeves suffered very few casualties and ordered a retreat. Reeves' force split into two during the retreat and was not able to regroup until the end of the battle.
The next thing Laon had to do was wait for the troops who had bypassed the ravine to get into position, but Price's light artillery regiment began to bombard the Union army.
The light artillery regiment was not deliberately hidden, but most Union soldiers did not notice their existence.
The artillery camp was located northeast of Winn's farm, on a ridge with sparse vegetation and parallel to Telegraph Road.
While preparing breakfast, they saw the retreat of Cawthorn's troops on the opposite hill. Without any orders, they ordered the artillery to go to the battery position. Soon after, these artillerymen saw an artillery battery more than half a mile away charging up Bloody Hill and then
Fire.
Woodruff realized that the situation was urgent and he had to fulfill his duties. The Union Army's two 12-pounder howitzers and two 6-pounder cannons quickly attracted the attention of the Federal artillery.
Woodruff's firepower delayed the Union's continued offensive, causing Lyon to gradually lose the battlefield initiative. In addition to the light artillery regiment, Totten's artillery battery was still trying to bombard the Confederate garrison.
They also attempted to bombard the Missouri Guards near Elwa Lodge, although the distance was shorter due to the width of Oak Mountain and the vegetation on the slopes.
They were unable to pinpoint the location of the Missouri Guards. For the same reason, Leon didn't know what was waiting for them besides Reeves' troops who had just appeared out of nowhere.
Out of caution, Leon continued to strengthen his line, extending more troops to his right flank.
It was already half past six in the morning when all deployments on Bloody Mountain were completed.
Although the artillery had been working hard to bombard the enemy, the Confederate troops were basically out of rifle range, so the Confederate troops had time to form their formation.
Because of the location of the Missouri Guards, the next task of stopping Leon's advance fell on Price's shoulders. A farm road led from Edward's farm to the top of Bloody Mountain.
Price, who had been running away before, vowed to avenge his shame this time.
Price presumably intended to follow this road to Raines' position. Before leaving his headquarters, he sent messengers to Brigadier General William Schleker and Brigadier General James McBride, requesting them to send infantry and artillery as soon as possible.
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Price's hopes of reaching Gibson's Mill were quickly dashed. He rode only a few hundred yards away when he saw a large Union force led by Leon himself charging up the hill. Price immediately returned to organize his troops.
Price positioned some of Cawthorn's troops at the base of Bloody Mountain, where the Confederacy could not see them due to the terrain on the southern slope.
A total of 1,600 soldiers formed the initial defensive line of the Missouri National Guard.
Reeves' 70 dismounted soldiers also joined Hughes' infantry, and other previously retreating troops also joined each regiment.
At about 6:30, Price had a total of 2,000 infantry and dismounted soldiers, as well as Guibor's artillery battery.
After the battle lines were deployed, Price began to lead his troops to attack the Union troops on the top of the mountain. The fighting began to escalate, and the sound of exchanges of fire could be heard in Springfield.
While Price was organizing his line, McCulloch and Bart Pierce were organizing their troops on the right bank of Wilson's Creek, and most of the Arkansas troops were cooking breakfast when fighting broke out.
Pierce, who rose early, sent Captain Charles Carroll, a company of forty men from the General's Guards Cavalry, to McCulloch's headquarters to request orders.
McCulloch had just received Raines' report when Carroll arrived, so McCulloch ordered Carroll's company to investigate.
By the time Carroll returned to camp, Pierce was aware of the enemy's arrival, ironically due to the poor discipline of his troops.
Two of Carroll's men left camp before dawn and headed east in search of a spring, possibly along a road that ran from near Camp Pierce through Manley's farm, where they encountered a small group of Union soldiers nearby.
The deserted Confederates immediately retreated, returning to camp about five o'clock and notifying Pierce that enemy troops were passing through the flank of the Western Army.
Their reports were both misleading and inaccurate, as Siegel was already farther south, preparing to attack.
Carroll's men apparently encountered the rear guard that Siegel had sent to protect the rear of his column. Pierce immediately sent Sergeant Hayter to warn McCulloch.
Shortly after Haight left, Carroll brought news of the Union's approach from the north. It was clear that Confederate forces were in danger from at least two directions.
Pierce was familiar enough with his surroundings that he reacted quickly after learning of the Federal attack.
Possibly hearing Woodroffe's cannon fire, he ordered the Pulaski Light Artillery to hold their position and sent Colonel John Graciot's 1st Infantry Regiment to support. Gratiot's regiment had a
Pre-war militia unit, the blue-coated Van Buren Border Guards.
To deal with threats on the flanks and rear, Pierce ordered Captain John Reed to position four guns from his Fort Smith Light Artillery regiment on a hill a few hundred yards east of the camp.
Colonel Tom Dockery's 5th Arkansas Infantry remained alongside the artillery.
Colonel John Walker's Fourth Arkansas Infantry Regiment was stationed directly north of the artillery unit to prevent the enemy from approaching from the road leading to Manley's farm.
Because Walker was ill, Pierce's adjutant, Colonel Frank Rector, took his place.
Finally, Pierce sent Carroll's Arkansas cavalry as an outpost to guard Reed's artillery against an unexpected attack.
Pierce's deployment on three sides to protect his camp was understandable due to the Union raid, but at this distance the Arkansas troops were unable to support McCulloch's Union troops and Price's Missouri Guards.
Pierce also lost contact with the cavalry unit at Sharp's Farm. If he could use this cavalry properly, they might be able to discover the ridge south of the camp overlooking the farm.
In addition, if the Fort Smith Light Artillery Regiment is deployed on higher ground with a better view, it may have a significant impact on the upcoming battle in the area.
But Pierce remained passive and did not take any proactive actions.
He placed Reed in a position with limited sight, and without a target, their artillery was silenced for over an hour.
The infantry was not well utilized, at least initially. While the 1,500 men of the 3rd Infantry Regiment spent several hours supporting the Pulaski Light Artillery, the remaining 3,200 Arkansas men
Then it's safe to stand there motionless for at least two hours.
The 1,550 soldiers of the 4th Infantry Regiment did not even fire a shot during the battle and suffered no casualties.
Pierce rode north to check on Woodruff, met McCulloch on the way, and presumably consulted with him, but apparently neither commander considered the Arkansans to play any offensive role.
Meanwhile, Plummer under Leon was attempting to complete his mission of pushing the Union left flank across Wilson's Creek toward Telegraph Road.
Instead of descending from the northern mouth and taking advantage of the ford south of Gibson's Mill, Plummer descended the steep slope to the east and joined Gilbert's regular army.
He took over Gilbert's location, which was "blocked by a lagoon" in "a thick jungle." Wilson's Creek was not deep, but Gilbert stumbled into the two towers built by John Gibson to power his mills.
A backwater area between dams.
It took the regulars a while to get through these obstacles, but after reaching the shore they ran into another patch of willows and reeds.
They had to push and pull each other, and their shoes filled with water and sand.
Plummer's troops moved quickly through Gibson's territory about half past six and entered the northern edge of John Ray's property.
After passing through the fence, when the Union soldiers found themselves in a field of "medium-height Indian corn," Lyon's main force had reached the top of Bloody Mountain and began to engage the Missouri Guards who were attacking the top.
Plummer therefore began to move as quickly as possible to synchronize the entire Union attack. As the Union troops advanced toward Ray's farmhouse, the ground slowly rose, but their view was obstructed by standing corn and occasional undulations in the ground.
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As the entire battalion advanced, it came suddenly under attack from the left flank. Although some bullets struck ears of corn and others ricocheted off bayonets, no one was injured.
The gunshots may have come from Raines' soldiers on the east side of the Wilson River who had been driven back in the early stages of the battle.
Although Plummer described the opposing firepower as negligible, the pause he made in dealing with the attack further slowed his already belated movement, giving the Southerners more time to react to the Union advance.
react.
As Plummer approached the center of the cornfield, he observed the Pulaski Light Artillery regiment firing on the Union line across the Bloody Hill valley.
In response, he turned his troops toward the artillery batteries, intending to launch a surprise attack if the opportunity arose. Unfortunately, they did not have this opportunity.
Woodruff's gunners had ample ammunition and had maintained a steady firepower since the battle began. They also withstood the Federal bombardment.
In a letter written the day after the battle, Woodruff proudly said: "My boys stood there like heroes, not one of them flinched, even though the shells kept coming like hail."
He added that at the earliest position of the artillery battery, only two soldiers were hit. The artillerymen had no time to mourn, and after discovering the approach of Plummer's troops, the captain sent a courier to warn of the return to Winn Farm.
McCulloch.
Returning to Confederate headquarters, McCulloch began organizing his troops.
He knew that Prince's Missourians were dealing with the threat from Bloody Mountain.
After consulting with Pierce, he was convinced that the Arkansas army would soon be in a good defensive position.
However, messengers told him that not far along Telegraph Road, Sharpe's Farm troops were in disarray.
The enemy's attack on the Confederate cavalry units stationed there caused great panic.
McCulloch had just decided to mobilize all Confederate troops to quell the danger behind his camp when news from Woodruff alerted him to the danger posed by Plummer's advance.
Therefore, he had to direct his adjutant, Colonel James McIntosh, to lead his own troops, the 2nd Arkansas Horse Infantry, as well as Lieutenant Colonel Dandridge McCrae's unassigned Arkansas Infantry Battalion and the 3rd Louisiana Infantry.
Cavalry regiment against Plummer.
McCulloch helped organize the force, then turned his attention to the remaining units, the 1st Arkansas Mounted Infantry and the South Kansas-Texas Cavalry, and the crisis facing Sharp's farm.
As was the case elsewhere, McCulloch's men were peacefully eating breakfast when the Union attacked.
The Louisianans rose early, as soon as the bugle sounded for roll call, and then were dismissed to prepare coffee.
The shadow zone prevented them from hearing the exchange of fire. The actions of other troops alerted them. When Colonel Louis Herbert ordered the 3rd Louisiana Infantry to assemble, many of the soldiers did not even have time to put on their uniform jackets.
The regiment's lieutenant colonel, Samuel Hyams, who was suffering from arthritis and had recently been kicked in the knee by "an Indian pony with a sore back," mounted his horse and followed Herbert.
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Then 1,700 soldiers of the 3rd Louisiana Infantry hit the telegraph trail. Lieutenant Colonel Dandridge McCrae's 520-man battalion deployed behind them, with McIntosh serving as McCulloch's adjutant and de facto
The second-in-command, Lieutenant Colonel Benjamin Embry, took command of the 1,400 men of the 2nd Arkansas Mounted Infantry shortly after taking personal command of the unit.
They bypassed Herbert and Macrae's troops. They advanced along the telegraph road to Ray's farm, passed the Pulaski Light Artillery position, and dismounted, where a small patch of woods provided protection for their horses.
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The mounted soldiers were delayed for a while on their way to the front, and McCulloch took it out on Herbert.
Herbert and McIntosh's men continued their advance through the bombardment zone of the Union counterattack against Woodruff's artillery, with trees along the way providing only limited protection to the men.
After moving a short distance, the column turned left onto a narrow farm road, which passed through dense brush and continued into a ravine, at the bottom of which was the Ray family's storage shed.
When the leading soldiers climbed up from the ravine, they immediately saw an overgrown fence in front of them, which was the southern end of John Ray's cornfield, and then they were shocked to find that Plummer's men were on the other side.
An encounter started immediately.
Plummer told his soldiers to kneel or lie down to protect themselves, but the Union troops were clearly at a disadvantage.
The weeds along the fence were so dense that it was difficult for the soldiers to see each other's positions. It was like they were attacking unknown prey in the bushes.
The shooting efficiency was very low, and most of the bullets missed.