Chapter 281 Return to Japan (14) Monarchy and Ministership
Gao pragmatic pondered and did not answer anything immediately, but Liu Ping knew that as long as he did not refuse, there was no need to be too anxious. Liu Ping had known Gao pragmatic for more than 20 years, and he knew that judging from Gao Ge's usual style,
He must be thinking of a solution at this time.
Liu Ping did not dare to rush, lest he interrupt Gao Ge Lao's train of thought, so he could only wait with bated breath.
Gao Pragmatic is really thinking of a way. Just as Liu Ping knows him, he also knows Zhu Yijun very well. This emperor is also stubborn in nature. Things that have not been decided may be easy to persuade, but once he has made a decision,
, it is more difficult to change.
Gao Wuchen's current judgment is that Zhu Yijun's greed for sea trade profits is not a temporary thing, but should have been around for a long time. Therefore, the royal fleet plan he proposes now should also have taken shape, and it is basically difficult to directly veto it.
Why is it so difficult to veto? It’s not because Gao Pragmatic believes that the Ming Emperor’s monarchy is really as supreme as some later generations thought and cannot veto it, but whether he wants to use “subordinate power” to overturn the monarchy now.
Later generations often say that the monarchy in the Ming Dynasty was the most authoritative in history. If we want to talk about this issue, we have to discuss the importance of imperial power in the Ming Dynasty compared with previous dynasties. If we want to compare the importance of monarchy with the past, we have to discuss the importance of imperial power and various political forces.
relationship.
In the Ming Dynasty, due to Taizu's purge of meritorious officials and the prevention of foreign relatives, the political power of the Ming Dynasty was nothing more than three types: imperial power, eunuch power, and ministerial power - except for the early Ming and Southern Ming Dynasties, ministerial power almost refers to the civil servant group.
right.
Compared with the Han and Tang Dynasties, eunuch power in the Ming Dynasty was always only the product of the extension of imperial power. What is extension? That is, the eunuch's power only comes from the monarch, and changes with the replacement of the monarch and his likes and dislikes, and is not affected by the monarch's stupidity and weakness.
The influence of the emperor. And the reason why he gained power was because he was the agent sought by the monarch who wanted to check and balance the civil servant class. Therefore, once the monarch was changed, the eunuch power that relied on the imperial power would also fall apart.
If Tianqi died, Wei Zhongxian and his party members who were attached to Tianqi's imperial power also collapsed. Since eunuch power was an extension of imperial power, eunuch power could never affect imperial power. As for the eunuchs' dethronement of monarchs that occurred in the Han and Tang Dynasties, Yu Ming
It is impossible to happen in one generation. Therefore, eunuch power has no impact on the size of imperial power.
In this way, eunuch power and imperial power in the Ming Dynasty were not antagonistic. The former was just an extension of the latter. Therefore, it is not tenable to use the great eunuch power to argue that the imperial power was weak, or to use the weak eunuch power to argue that the imperial power was great.
Among the main political forces in the Ming Dynasty, there were only imperial power, eunuch power, and ministerial power. Since eunuch power cannot affect the strength of imperial power, to discuss the size of monarchical power in the Ming Dynasty, we only need to look at the growth and decline between imperial power and ministerial power.
Since the beginning of the Ming Dynasty, Taizu abolished the system of prime ministerial auxiliary government that had been in place for more than a thousand years. However, the abolition of the prime minister does not mean that the Ming Dynasty has embarked on the road of monarchy and dictatorship compared with the previous dynasties. Why? It is nothing more than the relationship between the power of the prime minister and the imperial power.
, it has never been an oppositional relationship of one ebbing and the other elevating.
As Mr. Liu Zijian stated in the book "China Turns Inward", those who use the expansion of the prime minister's power to argue that the monarch's power is weak, or use the shrinkage of the prime minister's power to argue that the monarch's power is strong are all based on one premise: that is, the relationship between imperial power and
The sum of the powers of the court of the prime minister is an eternal and unchangeable quantity. Therefore, the prime minister's power and the monarch's power are in an antagonistic relationship, and the theory of dividing the imperial power by the prime minister's power, and even checking and balancing the imperial power, emerged accordingly.
However, the power of the court is not eternal. The premise of using the power of the prime minister to restrain the imperial power is self-defeating. Moreover, the imperial power can often improve the power of the prime minister and the imperial power by giving the prime minister more power, or even personally cultivating the prime minister.
After the prime minister leaves office, he can convert the imperial power possessed by the prime minister into his own power and improve the imperial power.
In the book "China Turns Inward", there are two examples from Lu Yihao and Qin Hui to demonstrate the above point of view.
At the beginning of the Southern Song Dynasty, military power was in the hands of the generals who were unwilling to listen to the imperial court's dispatches, and Gaozong's army only had about a few thousand people. Faced with such a dilemma, Gaozong's solution was to give Lu Yihao the power to intervene in the personnel affairs of the generals.
Financial power.
However, the prime ministers of the Song Dynasty should have no power to interfere with military, financial, and personnel matters. Lu Yihao gained greater power than ordinary prime ministers. If the power of the prime minister restrains the power of the monarch, Gaozong's power should have shrunk due to the expansion of Lu Yihao's power.
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But in fact, Gaozong was able to take back the power of generals, strengthen his control over local areas, and strengthen his own monarchy. At the beginning of the establishment of the Southern Song Dynasty, Gaozong was able to relieve the dilemma of having only a few thousand guards. Therefore, the so-called Prime Minister
The theory that power restrains monarchy is self-defeating. It can even be said that the prime minister is just a means for the monarch to centralize power.
Take Qin Hui again as an example. The Jurchens returned the coffin of Gaozong's father and released his mother and returned it to Henan as a condition for the Song Dynasty to contribute annual coins and recognize itself as a vassal of the Jin Kingdom. Gaozong himself was happy to accept it.
However, the opposition in the DPRK was fierce, and the generals who held military power were in charge of the war, making it difficult to implement Gaozong's peace talks. Gaozong's solution was to make Qin Hui the powerful prime minister, that is, the only prime minister.
Qin Hui was responsible for the peace talks, so that other bureaucrats could not interfere.
In addition, Qin Hui recalled the three major generals who were leading the battle to the central court and isolated them from the army. In addition to putting the army back under the control of the court, it also erased the influence of the voice of the main battle.
All these enabled Gaozong to implement his wish for peace talks, and resolved the issue of the weight of generals that Gaozong was worried about all day long, thus consolidating the power of the imperial court. After Qin Hui's death, these increased powers were transferred to Gaozong's hands.
Gaozong even used the attack on the Qin family as a means to "eliminate Qin Hui's abuse of power" and improve his own image and status. However, what Qin Hui did was actually Gaozong's wish.
It can be seen from this that the so-called power ministers are nothing more than agents in the process of centralization of imperial power and scapegoats after the consolidation of monarchy.
Furthermore, the power of the prime minister still needs the support of the imperial power. Although it cannot be said that the power of the prime minister is the same as the power of the eunuch, and they are both extensions and vassals of the imperial power, they still need the support of the monarch's power. Therefore, the theory that the power of the prime minister restricts the imperial power is really difficult to establish.
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For example: In 1134, Emperor Gaozong was confused and asked Zhang Jun bluntly: "When I discuss issues with the prime ministers, as long as they have slightly different opinions, they will ask for resignation so easily. Why is this?"
Zhang Jun replied: "As long as your Majesty reveals a little bit about the differences between you and the prime ministers, commentators will smell which side you agree with, and then write articles to support it and attack those prime ministers who have different opinions."
Under the attack of everyone, the prime minister had no other choice but to ask for resignation."
It can be seen that if the power of the prime minister is not supported by the monarch's power, or even if the prime minister's opinions are inconsistent with the monarch's opinions, he can only resign.
To sum up, three general conclusions can be drawn about the relationship between king and phase:
First, the power of the imperial court is not a variable, so the two are not in a conflicting relationship. The theory that the power of the prime minister restricts the power of the monarch is difficult to establish.
Second, the expansion of the prime minister's power can be a means for the monarch to centralize power. The expansion of the prime minister's power cannot restrict the monarch's power. The prime minister can even be said to be an agent and scapegoat that promotes the monarch's centralization of power.
Thirdly, the power of the prime minister needs the support of the monarch's power, so the theory that the power of the prime minister checks and balances the monarch's power is nonsense. Therefore, it is undesirable to say that the monarch's power in the Ming Dynasty has expanded unprecedentedly for more than 270 years simply because Taizu abolished the prime minister.
But at the same time, it must be admitted that after Taizu deposed the prime minister, and even during the period of Emperor Chengzu, the imperial power did strengthen, and it can even be said that within a period of time, it reached the pinnacle of monarchical power in all dynasties.
However, the reason for this is not that the monarch's power has lost the checks and balances of the prime minister's power, but that the emperor himself paid the price of diligent work day and night, which is a manifestation of his direct centralization of power without the need for the prime minister. This seems to give the monarch unlimited power.
, but in fact it relied heavily on the emperor's own ability.
Therefore, when later emperors were lazy and lived in the palace for a long time, and were unable to be as diligent and wise as Taizu, their control over power would naturally be greatly reduced. This explains why later emperors, especially those who were lazy in politics such as Wanli in the original history, were
Power could never be restored to Hongwu, the reason why the Yongle Dynasty reached the peak of its imperial power.
This leads to the conclusion that abolition of the prime minister will have no significant impact on the expansion of monarchy. Therefore, the so-called relationship between ministerial power and monarchy, or even the relationship between ministerial power and monarchy, should be excluded from the relationship between ministerial power and monarchy.
The components of power are discussed only in terms of the relationship between ministerial power, that is, the power of the civil servant group and imperial power.
Let’s start with the decision-making power. Nominally, the emperor of the Ming Dynasty had the highest decision-making power, and the main manifestation was the so-called red approval. However, the orders of the emperor of the Ming Dynasty had to go through six ministers, and the six subjects under them included
The emperor has the right to refute, and the emperor's order must be approved by the cabinet, otherwise it will be illegal.
Qian Mu said in "New Theory of National History": "In the Qing Dynasty, the emperor's important orders were issued directly from the Nanshufang Military Aircraft Department, and could be directly issued to the central and local administrative heads of various agencies. This was impossible in the Ming Dynasty and was illegal.
of.
The emperor's orders in the Ming Dynasty must first be issued to the six ministers, which are equivalent to the ministers of various ministries in today's Executive Yuan, but the emperor in the Ming Dynasty seems to have served as the Executive Yuan himself.
In the Ming Dynasty, there were special consultants under each Shangshu, so-called six ministers. They had the right to refute the emperor's orders, and as long as they disagreed, they could return the emperor's edicts intact."
Fang Zhiyuan also said in "The Structure and Operational Mechanism of State Power in the Ming Dynasty": "The drafting of the emperor's edict and the comments and replies of various ministers, if they are not drafted by the cabinet, are called central edicts, hand edicts, or 'internal edicts'.
The batch'... does not comply with normal procedures."
Zhu Yongjia's "The Origin and Gains and Loss of the Political System of the Ming Dynasty" also said: "If the drafting of the emperor's edict is called 'central edict', 'hand edict' or 'internal approval' without cabinet vote, then it cannot be counted."
The issuance of a legal and formal document...the vote will become a formal and indispensable procedure in the decision-making process."
Commentators often bring up the issue of eunuchs approving red votes every time they see a vote being drafted, to prove that the influence of ministerial power on decision-making is minimal. And eunuch power is an extension of imperial power, so this is used to discuss the dictatorship of the monarch. However, this theory does not hold true.
Because the so-called eunuchs still need to follow the system when approving celebrities, and they are not allowed to act arbitrarily.
Li Bozhong said in "Research on the National Decision-making Mechanism in the Late Ming Dynasty": "Under normal circumstances, whenever a chapter is memorialized, the ceremonial supervisor must send it to the emperor for reading, and major events must be approved by the emperor himself. The emperor's approval must be written in the chapter memorial, which is called 'Holy
Batch'.
The eunuch's approval is different from the saint's approval. First, the eunuch's approval is for common people; second, it must be approved by the cabinet before approval; third, the eunuchs who are responsible for the ceremony are divided into batches, not exclusive to one person; fourth, the approval must be based on the cabinet vote.
Red; fifth, the approval document is written next to Zhang Shu and is only used as a reference for the emperor to make decisions.
Among them, the cabinet's approval is the key, so the eunuch's approval of the red is also called 'the transfer and approval'. Without the cabinet's approval, it is considered illegal for the eunuch to approve the red without authorization, and the six subjects can be blocked."
It can be seen that the cabinet, that is, part of the ministerial power, plays an important role in the decision-making of the Ming Dynasty. Therefore, from a system or customary perspective, it cannot be said that the ministerial power is always weak, while the monarch's power is always strong.
In addition to the influence of the cabinet in decision-making, in the Ming Dynasty, whenever major military and state affairs were encountered, they followed the tradition of "major matters must be discussed together", so decisions were made through court discussions. This is recorded in the "Six Sections" of the Official Records of the Ming Dynasty
It can be seen from the "big affairs court discussion".
The so-called "major events" actually include the following matters: 1. discussing the establishment of the king; 2. discussing suburban sacrifices; 3. discussing ceremonies; 4. discussing ennoblement; 5. discussing marriage to the vassal; 6. discussing ministers; 7. discussing civil affairs.
The court consultation system was established in the early Ming Dynasty. Whenever major events occurred, the monarch would personally preside over and discuss with the ministers. At this time, the decision-making power was dominated by the monarch, but the ministers' power could also play a certain role in decision-making.
In the Yingzong period (especially the early period), because the emperor lived in the palace for a long time, the imperial meetings were presided over by ministers, and they became custom-made from then on. Most of the decisions on military and state affairs were based on the imperial meetings.
Statistics on court discussions in "On the Restrictions of the Imperial Power by the Ancient Chinese Court Meeting System":
This chapter is not finished yet, please click on the next page to continue reading the exciting content behind! "There are 101 court proceedings recorded in "Ming Hui Yao" Volume 45 "Gathering" (excluding the review of one matter and the content related to the court council system)
, 13 of which were vetoed or not reported by the monarch (they were not implemented by the subordinates).
Among these 13 items, the most common ones are the ancestral temple and the ceremony. There were 14 court discussions on the ancestral temple, 5 of which were vetoed (including 2 unreported ones); there were 11 ceremonies in total, 2 of which were vetoed. The monarch vetoed the court discussion
The number of cases accounts for about 12% of the total number of court discussions."
From this point of view, the court meeting does have a great influence on the decision-making of military and state affairs. And this influence, on the whole, is still in the hands of the civil servants. Even if the monarch occasionally vetoes the court meeting, it is mainly for the affairs of the ancestral temple.
, in other words, it is the internal affairs of the royal family. In this way, how can it be said that the current monarch is dictatorial in decision-making?
Now that we have discussed the court council, we should further discuss the system of court council, that is, the "minister council" item in the court council, in order to discuss the monarch's employment rights in the Ming Dynasty.
What is tingtui? It is the system of selecting important officials in the Ming Dynasty. The courtiers jointly decide on the candidates for senior officials.
"History of the Ming Dynasty" explains the system of court recommendation in this way: "The cabinet scholar and the official minister are recommended by the court or by special decree. Those who are below the minister and those who offer wine are recommended by the civil servants in conjunction with the third rank or above. Those below Taichang Qing are recommended by the ministry.
Tong, participate in the selection of the following civil servants at the Hongzhengmen meeting. Zhan affairs are handled by the cabinet, and each yamen is in charge of the seal. Foreign officials, Weidu, Fu Tingtui, nine ministers share it, and the chief of the civil servants is responsible. Bu, according to the lack of officials, third grade or above
Officials will be promoted."
However, whenever this point is discussed, there will always be those who insist on the so-called monarchical dictatorship of the Ming Dynasty, claiming that the final decision-making power of Tingtui is still in the hands of the emperor, so Tingtui is only a reference for the emperor, a tool of the emperor's rule, and for the use of the monarch.
There is no violation of human rights.
However, if we carefully study the role of the monarch in the court process, even if the nominal decision-making power is still in the hands of the monarch, looking at the actual operation, we will find that the emperor will still follow the results of the court process.
Volume 101 of "Records of King Sejong" records: "After the imperial edict was promoted to ministers, only those who agreed with each other could be heard. If the interview was distorted for a while, the Taoist officials would correct the edict."
Sometimes the emperor does not follow the results of the main recommendation - that is, the candidate listed first in the list according to the talent, qualifications, reputation, etc. of the official department, but chooses the accompanying recommendation, that is, the candidate listed later in the list. Often
It will also be condemned by the officials, and the person involved will refuse and not accept the official position to avoid being criticized by the public.
"History of the Ming Dynasty" Volume 233 "Biography of Wang Zongmu with Wang Shixing" records: "Henan lacks a governor, the court prefers the kingdom first, (the king's) scholarly nature comes second, and the emperor specializes in scholarly nature. The scholarly character is sparse in speech, and his reputation is not as good as the country's.
.”
This kind of thing is not unique in the Ming Dynasty.
As Liu Yulong said in "An Exploration of the Court Recommendation System for Civilian Ministers in the Ming Dynasty": "(Ting Recommendation) It is after the Ministry of Personnel has initially brewed up the candidates for the ministers, and then the court ministers will discuss it at a meeting, and jointly recommend the candidates who are popular among the people and have both political integrity and talent.
The officers were selected by the ministers for the emperor to choose.
This was objectively a restriction on the unprecedented expansion of imperial power at that time. Whenever the emperor violated the restriction and appointed ministers,
Scholar-officials who took it as their duty to maintain the feudal dynasty's legal system often came forward to make impassioned speeches and resist.
At the beginning of the Jiajing period, Emperor Shizong appointed Xi Shu, the minister of the Ministry of War in Nanjing, as the Minister of Rites by special decree. The court officials then lured him with the promise that Xi Shu could not be used by the court, and forced him to resign repeatedly.
On the eve of the 19th year of Wanli, Zhao Zhigao and Zhang Wei entered the cabinet with a special order. Lu Guangzu, the official secretary, wrote a letter, saying that the special slips were not made by the government, but the imperial court promoted "widespread loyalty and gather the people, and Du partiality listened to the traitors and eliminated the troubles of Ah Si".
'. Because there were so many opponents and the protests were fierce, Shenzong was forced to say that it would not set an example."
Interestingly, it was this function of dividing imperial power that made the Qing rulers of the Qing Dynasty angrily comment: "Jian Guan came from the imperial court, and it was actually the government of the Ming Dynasty." "Employing people is to control the great power, why should Tai'a be left alone!"
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In this way, the so-called court recommendation is only a reference for the emperor to employ people and does not affect the monarch's dictatorship, which is self-defeating. The influence of ministerial power in national decision-making is also obvious.
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ps: If you read this book today, you must have discovered that from my writing style, once I start writing "theory", it will inevitably mean that the plot direction will change. This chapter and the next chapter will be high-level
Theoretical foreshadowing before the subtle changes in the relationship between pragmatism and Zhu Yijun. Some of the issues mentioned in these two chapters are also the subsequent tests of Gao Pragmatism's conduct and governance abilities. You can wait and see.