However, although this operation brought many difficulties and dilemmas to subsequent local work, the effect was obvious. With the large amount of wood that could be demolished to build pontoon bridges, even if it encountered a relatively large river obstruction, the troops' marching speed
I wasn't delayed for too long either.
As for the time delayed by the enemy's blockade, it was not even as long as the time required for the forced demolition. Although the number of Japanese and puppet troops guarding the East and West Ujimqin banners was large, they did not have the ability to compete with such an army.
.Not to mention that these people do not have anti-tank weapons and do not know how to deal with these iron guys who are not afraid of bullets.
Even most of them, like their colleagues on the border, don't even know what the iron guys are charging towards them with tongues of fire spitting out fire. What they only know is that these behemoths covered with iron can hold no matter in their hands.
Neither a rifle nor a machine gun can stop it.
Under the impact of the armored brigade regardless of firepower and consumption, the puppet Mongolian army collapsed just like their colleagues on the border. The blocking of a small number of Japanese troops also had little effect due to the lack of anti-tank weapons. In addition, Wang Guangyu also
Deliberately avoiding places where the Japanese and puppet troops stationed heavy troops allowed the troops to advance very quickly.
Just here, Wang Guangyu was clearing roads through the mountains, building bridges across the water, and commanding the mechanized troops to forcefully assault the station of the 23rd Linxi Division. They were only a few hundred kilometers away from them at the junction of Paddock and Longhua in Rehe.
In a small mountain village, a meeting of cadres above the regiment level was being held for the Jire-Liaoning Army that had left the border. As for the content of the meeting, there was only one thing, which was a summary of the previous battles.
At the meeting, the commander of the 129th Division, who was currently commanding the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Region and the Taihang Military Region, and most of the 129th Division's active troops marching into the New Hebei Reliao Province, looked very unhappy. The reason was simple.
Because most of the troops did not fight well before, a large part of his worries before the war became reality. During the battle, various troops made many mistakes.
After leaving the customs, the vanguard troops used mobile ambush tactics to achieve a great victory. Many troops underestimated the enemy. They believed that they could not compete with the Japanese and puppet troops head-on because their equipment was not good and the ammunition was scarce. As long as the equipment was
Up there, there was nothing to fear from the Japanese and puppet troops. After winning the first battle, a large part of the troops relaxed their preparedness for the Japanese counterattack.
Not only is there a lingering feeling of underestimating the enemy among a considerable number of troops, but some of the old habits developed by long-term dispersed guerrilla activities are more or less committed again. Without orders from superiors, troops are dispersed without permission to get supplies, or to
To make a fortune. As a result, because they underestimated the enemy or dispersed the troops, they were unable to concentrate in a short period of time, and suffered heavy losses due to the rapid counterattack of the Japanese army.
A brigade, the vanguard of the entire army, encountered the Japanese troops marching west from Chifeng. Although they repelled the sneak attacks of the Japanese and puppet troops after several bloody battles, they suffered considerable casualties during the battle. Three regiments
Among them, one main regiment suffered casualties and more than half were captured, and another regiment suffered one-third casualties.
If the commander of the brigade had not been decisive, under the unfavorable situation, he quickly invested the last regiment in his hands to press the entire line. He also concentrated the artillery cover of the entire brigade and defeated part of the Puppet Manchukuo army serving as flank cover from the flanks.
, causing the Japanese and puppet troops to retreat because their flanks were exposed. Otherwise, the leading brigade might be eaten by the Japanese and puppet troops. The emergence of this situation made the old commander very angry.
With the battle going like this, not only did the commanders at all levels have problems themselves, but there were also many problems with the coordination among the troops. There were also a lot of problems with the coordination of infantry and artillery and the use of the most basic tactics. Even in terms of discipline, there were also problems.
Something went wrong.
Before the battle started, a regiment of the leading brigade dispersed two battalions to get food without receiving any orders. The other regiment, which served as flank cover for the entire army and guarded Chifeng, learned during the interrogation of the prisoners
More than 30 kilometers north of their base, there was a Japanese and puppet warehouse that supplied supplies to various tribes in Weichang County and stored a large amount of strategic materials such as grain, cloth, kerosene, etc., so they concentrated two battalions and attacked without asking their superiors.
.
As a result, this regiment, which was supposed to serve as flank security, encountered the Japanese and puppet troops. Only one battalion and a team directly under the regiment faced the battle. Moreover, this battalion, due to carelessness, relaxed its guard and was attacked by the Japanese and puppet troops. During the melee, weapons were
Most of them were scattered, and all the heavy machine guns were lost.
During the melee, the battalion commander among the cadres at all levels of the battalion was killed, and the instructor was captured and immediately killed by the Japanese and puppet troops. All six company commanders and instructors except one instructor were killed. Two-thirds of the cadres at all levels were also lost.
Especially the squad platoon leader and backbone suffered even more heavy losses. The whole battalion suffered casualties and most of them were captured.
What's more serious is that not only did the battalion itself suffer heavy losses, but the regiment headquarters and directly affiliated teams it covered also suffered considerable losses. The wounded in the regiment's directly affiliated health team were all captured by the Japanese and puppet troops because they could not be transferred quickly.
Then they were massacred. The regiment belonged to a mortar company, and all of them were captured because of the Japanese sneak attack.
Among the several regiment leaders, except for the regiment chief of staff who led the team to attack the Japanese and puppet warehouses and survived, the regiment leaders who stayed behind suffered heavy casualties, including the regiment leader who was seriously injured, the political commissar died, and the deputy regiment leader was injured after being surrounded by the Japanese and puppet troops.
In order to avoid being captured, he drew his gun and committed suicide. The director of the regiment's political office was missing during the battle. The radio station was also lost in the melee.
The unauthorized actions of these two regiments caused the leading brigade to fall into passivity in a very short period of time when encountering a Japanese counterattack. They relaxed their vigilance and caused serious losses to themselves. Originally faced with a counterattack,
The Japanese and puppet troops' superior strength turned into a disadvantage.
As for the troops they sent out to collect food without authorization, they were unable to be transferred back due to communication and distance reasons. The battalion of the regiment that went out to collect food without authorization also encountered puppet troops with the cooperation of two Japanese cavalry squadrons.
A cavalry regiment and an infantry regiment of the Manchu Army encircled.
If the battalion commander hadn't been quite capable, and after discovering the Japanese and puppet troops being surrounded, he would have seized the highest hilltop in the surrounding area to block the attack, the battalion might have been completely lost. Although the main force of the battalion was saved because of the battalion commander's quick response.
They survived, but a company serving as a cover, in order to cover the transfer of the brigade, was all sacrificed by the Japanese and puppet cavalry, and no one survived.
After discovering the enemy attack, the brigade conducted a counterattack. Although the brigade concentrated all artillery fire and light and heavy machine guns to cover the only intact main regiment left on hand to detour from the flanks, there were also incidents during the battle.
The problem of disjointed coordination between infantry and artillery.
During the counterattack, the commander of the brigade still had some petty problems and kept the artillery in his own hands. The artillery personnel had no suggestions on how many rounds to fire during the battle, when to fire, and where to hit the shells.
You can only obey the orders of the brigade commander.
The commander was too unfamiliar with artillery command, which resulted in the fact that not only the infantry here rushed forward, but the artillery over there still hadn't fired a single shell. Or the artillery preparations had been completed for more than ten minutes, but the infantry here hadn't fired yet.
Action. Even in order to save artillery shells, after the first-line battle entered close combat, the artillery did not suppress the second-line enemy forces and block enemy reinforcements.
This kind of tactical use made artillery play little role in the battle. The brigade even participated in the battle with a mountain artillery battery of six guns, an infantry artillery battery of four 92 infantry guns, and two 37 combat anti-aircraft guns.
Twelve artillery pieces. Under the blind command of their superiors, all the first wave of artillery shells failed to hit the target.
Although all the artillery of the brigade were concentrated in the battle, the commander of the brigade evenly distributed the use of artillery, just like issuing clothes, firing a few in each direction. During the battle, the artillery firepower did not form a key target.
Instead, a front-line pressure approach was adopted. The ten artillery pieces of the two artillery companies were not organized into artillery groups to participate in the battle. Instead, they each selected their targets and formed a tactic of fighting independently.
When the Japanese artillery fire counterattacked, they did not know to move their positions. After the fire cover was completed, the people below put forward reasonable suggestions for moving their positions, but they were criticized as being greedy for life and fear of death. As a result, the artillery of the brigade was killed when the Japanese and puppet troops counterattacked the artillery fire.
The losses were heavy. In addition to the infantry artillery and combat defense artillery, only one combat defense artillery was lost due to their lightness and rapid movement. Half of the six mountain guns were lost.
Not only were serious mistakes made in the use of artillery, but even the most basic light and heavy machine guns and grenade launchers were used without specifying the focus of suppressing the target. After the battle started, all light and heavy machine guns fired continuously, which was a huge waste of ammunition.
The battle was about to consume all the machine gun ammunition carried by the brigade.
Moreover, during the battle, the light and heavy machine guns were evenly placed in a line, and did not form a trapezoidal configuration according to the range. These machine guns, all placed on the front line, suffered heavy losses in the artillery fire of the Japanese and puppet counterattacks. And a regiment participating in the battle mortared
The artillery battery ran in the wrong direction during the movement. It was covered by long-range artillery fire from the Japanese and puppet troops and was completely lost.
When launching an attack, no one thinks about which part is covering and which part is charging. Which part is responsible for the main attack, which part is responsible for assisting, and which part is the reserve team. The deployment of troops and equipment is all based on egalitarianism, and everything is done at every turn.
The team went to battle.
As soon as the battle started, there were only a few cadres of the regiment, including battalion and regiment level cadres, who were in their command positions, and they all rushed out. Even the deputy commander of the regiment left his troops to lead the charge, and there were only a few in the command post.
A director of the Political Department was retained. This situation was brave, and it indeed boosted morale.
However, during the battle, he was separated from his command position, resulting in poor communication between the head and tail of the unit. When the troops below asked for instructions, no one in the command post responded, which also caused heavy casualties among the cadres. Six regular battalion cadres from the three battalions of the regiment
, except for one instructor who was not injured during the battle, one of the remaining five people was killed and all the others were injured. The deputy commander who took the lead in the charge and fought with the puppet Manchukuo army on the bayonet was also seriously injured during the battle.
Even after the battle started, the telephone line between the frontline troops and the command post behind them was not set up. Communication between the front and rear still relied on correspondents and buglers. After the correspondents and buglers were killed by precise fire from the Japanese and puppet troops, the entire unit communicated with each other.
All communication links were interrupted, and each battalion and even each company fell into a situation of fighting on its own.