Chapter 123: The Conflict Between Yeluzi and Normalization
Now commanders at all levels of the customs forces rely more on their own personal abilities on the battlefield. In this case, it is okay to command simple infantry operations. But commanding a synthetic, even semi-synthetic, force
Fighting a synthetic battle is a bit difficult.
During his time in the Guan Nei army, Lin Zhiqiang also found that the overall professional level of the staff of most of the troops in the Guan Nei was actually much poorer. These staff officers were not so much operational staff as some department administrators, or even lower-level troops.
reserve commander.
Except for high-level headquarters and individual units, the number of staff officers at most brigade and regiment levels is either insufficient or their level is too low. Some staff officers can’t even make a simple map. In most units, staff officers are
The training and education are not enough. Except for a few talents trained by large military regions, most of the staff officers have false reputations.
In many cases, these staff officers are not staff officers who should be staff officers, and they are blind staff officers who should not be staff officers. Especially at the regiment level, it is even more serious. The combat staff officers cannot read maps, and the communications staff officers cannot play with radios. When they arrive on the battlefield, they still
He often led the charge on behalf of lower-level commanders. This is very different from the situation where the chief of staff of the Anti-Japanese Alliance had great authority and the staff officers at all levels had clear division of labor and what should be done.
Ever since the troops came out of the border, and even as early as the formation of this brigade, and since Lin Zhiqiang was appointed as the brigade's chief of staff, they did not get along well with the brigade commander of the leading brigade. It was not because of other reasons, but that the two sides had different feelings about some military affairs.
There are too many differences in concepts and some military deployments.
The combat environment inside and outside the pass is different, the enemy situation is different, and the actual surrounding situation is even more different, which leads to a huge difference in the military concepts of the two sides. Especially when he and the pass were transferred to the northeast, he has experienced both battlefields inside and outside the pass.
The people who are different are different. They are cadres who were born and raised in the Anti-Japanese Federation. The gap between the two sides in some aspects is even greater.
The leading brigade commander of the troops leaving the customs had served as the main regiment commander as early as in the Red Army. After arriving in the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Region, he served as the commander of the military division. Moreover, his position has always been the most critical in the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Region.
The position and the long-term self-sufficient military struggle life make this leading brigade commander not only have the ability to take charge of his own affairs, but also have extremely rich practical experience.
What's more important is that in the long-term and arduous struggle, a set of its own military theories has been formed. Although in terms of infantry and artillery coordination and contract tactics, it can be said that it is basically limited by its own vision and the long-term lack of heavy equipment within the customs troops.
None. But his actual combat skills are extremely solid. When it comes to guerrilla warfare and mountain warfare, he can be called an expert.
You know, the Guannei Army is a military division organized according to a division of the Anti-Alliance Force, and there are only a few mortars. There are only a few mortars, and the shells are as precious as gold, and they will never be willing to use them. I just want to
Even if you have experience in this area, there is no place to learn it. If you want to engage in coordinated operations with multiple arms, you don't have the conditions. Basic artillery is lacking, let alone other heavy equipment.
Moreover, the conditions of the troops inside and outside the pass are different, and the application of some basic infantry tactics is also very different. Because of the limitations of equipment and ammunition, the troops inside the pass focus more on hand-to-hand combat, ambush warfare, and mountain mobile warfare. As for fire suppression, they mainly rely on sharpshooters and
A small number of machine guns.
However, some basic infantry tactical training, as well as the use of infantry firepower, are very different from the anti-alliance tactical training that Yang Zhen personally planned and drafted. There is no way, if the conditions are not good, we can only follow the existing conditions. Almost all grassroots cadres who came out of the regular military academy
No, the equipment conditions are extremely poor. All tactical training can only be done according to your own conditions.
This also results in the fact that the combat styles and tactics of the regiment-level combat units in the entire army are not the same. Even the three regiments under a brigade have three combat styles. It can be said that a hundred flowers bloom, each with its own tricks. This
With one brigade and three regiments, there are actually three different combat command styles. I am afraid this is the only one in the world.
Different from the later period of the Liberation War when various units were organized into columns and brigade-level combined combat units. At this time, most of the 18th Group Army still used the regiment level as its basic combat unit. In other words, in the case of dispersed guerrillas,
Each army is actually an independent combat unit based on regiments.
But it was precisely these so-called wild men in the eyes of some regular troops that a master was beaten to death by random punches. The Japanese officers who had received strict training suffered great losses in the mountain warfare in North China. Although because of the equipment
and training could not change the situation of the war, but they also prevented a large number of Japanese troops from going south.
The equipment of the troops inside the pass is poor. If a regiment can have five heavy machine guns and a platoon can have one light machine gun, it is considered the absolute main force. If it has one or two mortars, it will be the trump card of the entire military region.
.In a situation where there are few machine guns, a severe shortage of ammunition, and even fewer heavy firearms, and don’t even think about artillery, even if you want to engage in some infantry-machine collaborative training or infantry-artillery collaborative training, you can’t do it.
The reason is very simple. We don’t have the capital to do it. Although the equipment is now available, due to time constraints, although the training level of the troops has improved to a certain extent, there is still a certain gap between the capabilities of commanders at all levels and the actual needs. The main reason is that
This is manifested in the lack of proficiency and mastery in the use of artillery, and it is even difficult to configure and use machine guns freely.
Most of the time, the task of the machine gun is to shoot where there are more people. As for fire suppression and blockade, there are not so many bullets to waste, and there is no need. Moreover, most of the cadres below the battalion who have not received formal military education have not
I don’t know how to deploy the focus of machine gun firepower.
In most cases, when cadres at all levels command operations, they still rely on the wild paths they have honed during the long war. When commanding on the battlefield, they also rely more on the experience they have accumulated over the years. That is,
A graduate of the War University who makes many people proud.
Although the senior leaders of each army have repeatedly wanted to strengthen the training and education of grassroots cadres, especially military cadres. When each division crossed the Yellow River eastward, they established their own battalion schools. However, due to restrictions,
Most of the cadre education can only stay in the initial stage. Except for a few of the middle and senior cadres who entered the Anti-Japanese University, most of them still learn on the battlefield.
This is also the reason why the central government immediately established higher military academies and a large number of infantry schools after the founding of the People's Republic of China to conduct rotational training for various units from senior commanders to grassroots commanders. Even this kind of training was used even in the most intense and final battles of the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea.
Even when military cadres were needed, they did not stop.
And the unique military theory formed through long-term training has made a large number of commanders in the troops who left the customs form a deep-rooted belief in their minds that they should only believe in their own ideas. As for the cadres who were transferred from the anti-resistance coalition,
Those plans seemed good to them, but the key point was that they were not suitable for their troops.
Of course, they are still very willing to see the improvement of the tactical level of their troops. After all, no commander wants to see his troops suffer excessive casualties due to the use of their troops' tactics in battle. Although learning on the battlefield has made great progress
, but the casualties are also greater.
Veterans are equally important to the national army on the frontal battlefield and to the 18th Army operating behind enemy lines. Therefore, these commanders are still very optimistic about the improvement of the tactical level of their troops. However,
The command on the battlefield is still respectful and insensitive.
As for those who analyze and judge the progress of the battle, propose various plans and other staff duties, they believe more in their own judgment and sense of smell on the battlefield. In their opinion, if the commander and staff can do the work,
What else do we need a commander for? We might as well hand over the troops to a group of staff officers.
Before the attack on the leading brigade this time, Lin Zhiqiang had repeatedly suggested that the troops should move closer to each other. If they do not want to move closer to each other, then it is best for the three regiments to form an intersection and deploy in a zigzag pattern. Once they encounter the Japanese and puppet troops,
For sneak attacks, various units can coordinate with each other.
At the same time, each regiment is required to organize on-duty firepower consisting of light and heavy machine guns and mortars. The brigade must also establish on-duty firepower based on the mountain artillery company. The situation around each regiment's station must be marked in advance. Once encountered,
The Japanese attack can be suppressed immediately with firepower.
When each regiment chooses its garrison, it is best to control the surrounding commanding heights and set up simple defenses. When each unit is resting, try not to choose a village. Troops at the regiment level must be absolutely gathered together.
, there can be no dispersed garrison situation.
But these suggestions of his were directly rejected by the leading brigade commander without hesitation. The reason seemed to the leading brigade commander to be very simple: "Once the Japanese army really comes for a sneak attack, with the Japanese army's firepower configuration, if the three regiments get closer,
One shell will cause heavy casualties to the troops. Although the current equipment level of the troops has been greatly improved, it is still far behind the Japanese army."
As for other suggestions, except for controlling the surrounding commanding heights as much as possible, they have basically not been adopted. Choosing villages as resting places can have a relatively stable position to rely on once encountering an enemy situation. As for on-duty firepower, for the troops inside the pass,
What a waste of ammunition.
Even if they are surrounded by strong enemies, they can rely on the villages to persist until they escape after dark. Even if the troops are dispersed, they can still escape under the cover of the common people. This is a method that has been tried and tested by the troops inside the pass on the battlefield behind enemy lines. On duty
Firepower is not used at all. What kind of ammunition is there, it is better to use it on the battlefield.
In the opinion of these commanders, night fighting is our strength. As long as we rely on the villages to persist until dark, we will not be afraid no matter how many Japanese and puppet troops come. With villages that can be used as ready-made fortifications, why bother sleeping in the wild?
What kind of simple defenses are you spending so much effort on?
The differences in key military concepts made Lin Zhiqiang, the chief of staff, very frustrated, at least he thought so. But as a soldier, he knew that obeying orders was his bounden duty. Although because of different concepts, the suggestions were rarely accepted.
When he accepted it, he still upheld the most basic morals of a soldier and did his job conscientiously. It was just work as work, but let alone the frustration in his heart.