In previous battles, although the Japanese 37 rapid-fire cannons could not penetrate the armor of anti-Union tanks, they still posed a great threat to external vehicle lights, anti-aircraft machine guns, radio antennas and other ancillary equipment, as well as additional armor. This is still a big threat.
The shock waves and shrapnel produced by the explosion of other mountain artillery, infantry artillery, mortars, grenades and other ammunition do not count the damage to these ancillary equipment.
In addition, the Japanese infantry often resorted to self-inflicted anti-tank attacks with grenades or explosives strapped all over their bodies, and other suicide anti-tank methods. Although not many tanks were completely lost, these tanks were more or less lightly injured.
There are quite a few tanks.
Although the tank cannot completely lose its combat effectiveness, it also weakens the tank's combat performance to a certain extent. Car lights are necessary equipment for night operations, and anti-aircraft machine guns are the best equipment for air defense and dealing with Japanese infantry. As for the radio antenna,
Not to mention. Without the antenna, the vehicle-mounted radio on the tank is basically completely useless.
Fortunately, the 23rd Division had a serious shortage of gasoline at this time, and most of the remaining gasoline was secretly withheld by Lieutenant Colonel Ikoma Hayashi for his own 3rd Tank Regiment. The gasoline on hand was enough to last for 20 consecutive days.
The operation of the more than 20 trucks of the Third Division's baggage regiment was ineffective.
The 23rd Division, which was short of gasoline, wanted to make the most lethal incendiary bottles for the Anti-Japanese Alliance tanks but had no raw materials. In addition, in order to prevent the Japanese army from using meat bomb attack tactics, the Anti-Japanese Alliance installed a layer of barbed wire on the engine.
The Japanese troops threw a small number of Molotov cocktails, but most of them were bounced away before they burst.
Otherwise, according to the crazy energy of the Japanese soldiers when they came up, the losses of the anti-alliance tanks will be even greater. In the Battle of Nomonhan, the Japanese army adopted this simple suicide attack tactic of meat bombs and Molotov cocktails, destroying dozens of tanks.
Soviet tanks covered by infantry. Even when Wang Guangyu led the team to make a circuitous route, the wreckage of Soviet tanks was still scattered throughout the Nomonhan grassland.
Even if the Anti-Japanese Alliance tanks are modified like this, the engine will always be the weakest and most deadly place of the entire tank. Because the engine needs to dissipate heat when it is running, no armor can be installed there. Otherwise, the heat will
If it cannot be dispersed, the engine will burn out in a short time without the enemy destroying it.
It is not yet clear whether other Japanese divisions were proficient in anti-tank tactics and whether they were like this when adopting a body-munition offensive. However, the 20 Japanese divisions who fought bloody battles with overwhelming Soviet tanks on the Nomonhan battlefield
The Third Division definitely has its own set of anti-tank tactics.
The 23rd Division, which had experienced the battle that was definitely the most impressive for the Japanese army, and saw what a truly modern battle was. They knew very well where the tanks were most vulnerable, and they knew how to use human bombs to attack them.
When, what tactics to adopt, and which parts to attack are most effective.
Compared with anti-tank direct-aiming artillery, using people to carry out body bomb attacks does cause heavy casualties, and some do not take human lives seriously. But undoubtedly compared to anti-tank guns that can only fight in fixed positions and have a limited number,
This kind of human bomb attack is both sufficient in quantity and relatively flexible. It can also find the weakest point of the tank and attack it.
Fortunately, when the roundabout troops attacked the Japanese fortifications, the infantry cooperated quite well. Moreover, the Japanese army lacked gasoline to make Molotov cocktails. At the same time, the anti-alliance armored forces had also made certain preparations for this kind of human bomb attack by the Japanese army, and carried out corresponding measures.
Training. Otherwise, according to the so-called bushido spirit of the Japanese army that does not take human life seriously, the losses of the 1st Armored Brigade in the Linxi battle would never have been so light.
Because the lethality of grenades to tanks is much smaller than that of Molotov cocktails. The lethality of Japanese grenades alone cannot explode the armor on the vehicle. Of course, if cluster grenades are used, they can get into the bottom of a tank that has basically no protection or
If it blows up the engine, that's another matter.
However, under other circumstances, as long as the turret is not pried open by the Japanese and a few grenades are thrown into the cockpit to cause damage to the crew, it is generally difficult to cause irreparable damage to the tank. But even if a variety of methods are adopted
, under the Japanese meat bomb offensive, the number of tanks damaged by the Anti-Japanese Alliance was still quite large.
Especially the Soviet-made T-26B tanks and BT-5 tanks obtained in Outer Mongolia, because they have not yet been equipped with additional armor, even though they were placed on the second line, they suffered heavy losses under the Japanese 37 rapid-fire artillery and meat bomb attacks.
The tanks that suffered major and permanent losses were basically those obtained from Outer Mongolia without additional armor. This also proves the old saying that you can't take advantage of it in vain. Sooner or later, you will have to spit out some of what you eat...
Although the original tanks of the roundabout troops did not suffer permanent losses, under the attack of Japanese 37 rapid-fire cannons and meat bombs, a large number of tracks were broken and the road wheels were destroyed. Although these tanks have now passed
Emergency repairs were made, but they were only able to barely fight.
In addition to deliberate tactical arrangements based on the performance of our own tanks, we insisted on not engaging in close combat with the Japanese on the flanks. Many of the tanks on the flanks were battle damaged and had not been repaired, which was also a large part of the reason. In the flank direction,
The offensive was just to spread the strength of the Japanese army. If we really wanted to fight the kind of close combat that Ikoma Lin wanted to fight, it would be detrimental to the alliance.
Because after the small number of spare explosive reactive armor and additional armor were allocated to the troops heading north, the repair battalion did not have enough spares to replace the lost parts on the battle-damaged tanks. They could only temporarily disassemble the tanks.
The reactive armor behind the car body, which has less chance of being shot, is moved to the front of the car body to strengthen the defensive capabilities of the front armor.
Without additional armor protection, the rear part of the tank is the weakest armored part of the entire tank. Its protective power at this time is no different from that of similar Soviet tanks in the Battle of Nomonhan. Once the Japanese army detours back to the anti-alliance tanks
Behind the body, the threat posed by these similarly thin-skinned tanks is also quite deadly.
In melee and close combat, it is difficult to ensure that the front of the vehicle is always facing the enemy. Therefore, under Wang Ziyang's repeated urging after discovering Ikoma Lin's true intention, the 3rd Battalion of the 1st Armored Brigade Tank Regiment, which commanded the flanking troops,
The commander still chose to follow his request. He only used artillery fire five hundred meters away to weaken the attack of the enemy in front of him, and avoided close combat and melee with Japanese tanks as much as possible.
If it weren't for the low performance of the Japanese tank artillery and the ineffective armor-piercing projectiles they used, and the Japanese commander's misjudgment of the performance of the allied tanks, the outcome of this battle would still be difficult to say, at least it wouldn't be won so easily.
, and there will not be a one-sided situation.
In fact, Wang Ziyang specified the tactics of this battle based on his understanding of the Type 97 tanks, which were the main force of the Japanese army, and the conditions of the participating troops. To attract and divide the Japanese troops on the flanks, and at the same time make use of the original deployment of the Twelfth Army.
The front-line tank force's establishment was still intact. A tank company from the reinforced reserve team pressed forward across the front. Taking advantage of its equipment and firepower advantages, it took the lead in defeating the Japanese tank squadron in the front.
It's just that he didn't expect Ikoma Lin's consecutive mistakes in judgment in the use of tactics. Instead, he moved the Type 97 tanks as the main force to the flanks, hoping to defeat the flank assault troops first so as to ensure smooth front-line communication with Sunjiayingzi. As a result
However, he was held back and was unable to return to the front line in time to support the front line, which also helped him a lot to a certain extent.
At the same time, the inconvenience caused by the Japanese army's backward tank communication system caused the Japanese Third Tank Regiment, which was divided into two places, to have poor communication with each other. This seriously affected the mutual communication between the two Japanese tank groups, and further affected the
This shows Commander Ikoma Hayashi’s grasp and judgment of the entire battle situation.
The crew quality of Japanese tanks is indeed quite excellent. Whether it is the hit rate of short-stop shooting or the cooperation between various tank groups, they are obviously superior to the tank crews of the Anti-Japanese Alliance. However, the flaws in the equipment are
However, the Japanese army's training level alone cannot make up for it.
Especially under the situation that although the quality of the tank crews of the Anti-Japanese Alliance has a certain gap with that of the Japanese army, this gap is not very obvious. The gap in equipment performance directly affects the final direction of the battle and determines two aspects.
victory or defeat. And the gap in equipment is not as obvious as usual.
If the Japanese Army's Type 97 tanks can barely compete with the Anti-Japanese Alliance's modified T-26 tanks to a certain extent, and can penetrate the additional armor on the Anti-Japanese Alliance tanks at very close range, then the Japanese Army's Type 95 tanks
The Type 94 light tank, facing an opponent that is completely different from the original one, is simply dying in vain. Coupled with those Type 94 tanks that can only be called armored vehicles at best, what can they withstand after the Anti-Japanese Alliance has been improved and upgraded?
The last tank?
Of course, if the armor of the original BT tank is only a dozen millimeters thick, the Japanese Type 95 light tank will still have a certain ability to compete. Even if it can deal with the T-26B tank with a turret frontal armor thickness of 25 millimeters, it will still be able to compete with it.
It's not that it doesn't have the strength to fight in a battle at all. The 37mm artillery equipped with it can still penetrate the front armor of these two tanks within a distance of 500 meters.
But in the face of the heavily improved and upgraded Anti-Alliance tank force, the Japanese Army's Type 95 tanks can be said to have quickly fallen behind. And even the Japanese Army's Type 97 tanks, which currently have the best performance except for artillery, have
The 57mm tank gun is basically useless as long as the distance exceeds 150 meters.
Among the three types of tank guns used by the Japanese army in the Twelfth Front, only the 47mm Type 1 tank gun on the 1997 modified tanks can pose some threat to the tanks of the Anti-Japanese Alliance. Therefore, except for the 1997 modified tanks,
In addition, the low-performance tank guns on most Japanese tanks undoubtedly exacerbated this equipment gap.
Currently, the various tank guns on the Japanese tanks are not modified cannons or anti-tank guns from ordinary countries, but howitzers that are more suitable for supporting infantry in combat and destroying enemy fortifications. The real meaning of these artillery is to support infantry
Attack the enemy's fortified positions rather than engage in anti-tank operations.
Tanks are an organic combination of mobility, firepower, and defense. They will not stand still like fortifications, waiting for you to approach and destroy them. You have a muzzle velocity and a relatively short range, and they are effective against armor-piercing projectiles.
The limited howitzer is actually very ineffective as a tank main gun.
As the main force of the Japanese army, the 57mm short-barreled howitzer equipped on the Type 97 tank has poor performance. Although it has a large caliber, its anti-tank capability is not strong. When it reflects high-explosive grenades to attack fortifications, it is indeed very powerful. But when it comes to armor-piercing
In terms of capability, it is far inferior to the 45mm tank gun used on anti-alliance tanks.
The gap in equipment, the misunderstandings in the design and use of Japanese tanks, and the serious mistakes made in the use of tactics. As the first battle between tanks in Chinese and Japanese history, this battle was the third battle.
It is not surprising that the car team ended in a disastrous defeat. For Ikoma Hayashi, who was launching an attack with all his strength at this moment, this may be the difference that determines fate.