When the Anti-Japanese Alliance is unable to maintain itself due to excessive road transportation consumption, it can only weaken its military strength in Western Manchuria. And after the Kwantung Army has received domestic supplementary forces to recover, will it be very difficult to regain Western Manchuria? Fighting for strength
In terms of sustained combat capability, the Anti-Japanese Alliance was far inferior to the Kwantung Army supported by Japan and South Manchuria industry.
Although Yoshijiro Umezu is considered to be the most capable among all the previous chiefs of staff of the Kwantung Army, Yoshimoto Teiichi's vision still does not break away from the shackles of the Japanese military's traditional concepts. Although his judgment is quite reasonable, it is
The Japanese concept is a bit too paranoid when considering the actions of their opponents.
For the Japanese army, whose mechanization capability is still quite low and the replenishment of strategic materials mainly relies on railways, the general battlefield cannot be far away from the main railway trunk line 250 kilometers. Once it exceeds 250 kilometers, it can be maintained in a short period of time. But if it falls into
In a long-term combat situation, the replenishment of supplies will be in trouble.
This is also the main reason why the Kwantung Army concentrated its main forces in the Eastern Manchuria area where railways are denser in previous battles, while only one 23rd Division was left on the battlefield in Western Manchuria.
There is not even one meter of railway line in the vast area from Nanxing'an to Chifeng in the south and Tongliao in the east.
Without railways and water transportation on both sides of the Yangtze River in the Guanchi battlefield, the Japanese were unable to maintain a large garrison with their tactical supply capabilities. In fact, looking at the map of China after the July 7th Incident, it is not difficult to find that the Japanese throughout the Anti-Japanese War
For most of the time, the occupied areas were maintained along the Jinpu Railway and on both sides of the Yangtze River and coastal areas.
Why did they not continue westward after occupying Yichang? It was because once the Yangtze River shipping and railway lines were separated, their supply capacity dropped by more than one level, and they were simply unable to maintain large-scale combat capabilities. They could rob food, but not ammunition and other
Where do you go to grab military supplies?
Don’t think that the Japanese in World War II really didn’t have much appetite, so they just occupied the most developed areas in southeastern China. Don’t think that the Japanese really cared too much about the interests of the United States and Britain to dare to completely occupy China. The reason why they grew up
Time places the furthest distance to the west in Yichang, and we are unable to continue westward because after Yichang we reach the Three Gorges.
The Three Gorges, which are still known as the Gate of Hell, especially the Xiling Gorge, which is full of rapids and dangerous shoals, restricts the use of the Japanese navy. The high mountains and ridges of the Wushan Mountains on both sides of the Taiwan Strait make it impossible for the Japanese army to maintain a supply line, and at the same time it also limits its own capabilities.
There was not much movement of mechanized and heavy artillery units.
Relying on naval supplies? The Chinese army doesn't even need to deploy painstakingly. As long as it deploys a few artillery companies along the Three Gorges and removes all the navigation beacons along the river, it is enough to blockade their naval ships in the Three Gorges. The Three Gorges is not their 10,000-ton
Nanjing is a place where Japanese-class ships can go back, let alone Wuhan where Japanese light cruisers and ships can pass.
The Three Gorges and the high mountains without even simple roads in many areas of western China are like a barrier, firmly blocking the Japanese army's attempt to continue westward. Just kidding, the road to Sichuan is difficult, and it is difficult to reach the sky. This saying is not just for the Chinese
Prepared. When China withdrew from the west into Sichuan, even if there were people who were familiar with the waterway to pilot the ship, how many ships and supplies were lost in the Three Gorges?
It is the same not only in Yichang, Shaanxi, and Hunan. The continuous mountains in the west lack favorable transportation lines. This makes supplies highly dependent on railway lines and water transportation. Short-term operations without railway lines are possible, but long-term operations are very difficult.
It is difficult for the Japanese army to hold on. No matter how much they want to completely wipe out China, they can only stop their steps.
As for the northwest direction, it is far inferior to Central and South. The Yellow River is not the Yangtze River. The Japanese warships on the Yangtze River can be traced back to Yichang, deep into the Han River, Xiangjiang River, Ganjiang River and other larger tributaries of the Yangtze River, and even Dongting Lake and Poyang Lake. The water volume of the Yangtze River is enough to support
The Japanese army fought in the section of the river below Yichang and within hundreds of kilometers around both sides of the strait. Its small ships took some risks and could go deep into the Three Gorges from time to time.
But this is not possible in the northwest. The amount of water in the Yellow River prevents large ships from going too deep. Sanmenxia, which has been known as the Yellow River's gate to hell since ancient times, is enough to keep out even small Japanese ships. Without supplies and effective roads,
Tanks and heavy artillery cannot move.
Without the support of tanks and heavy artillery, do you really think that all Japanese soldiers are like gods with one enemy against a hundred? Although the Chinese army lacks weapons and its tactics are backward, it does not lack courage. What if there is really no condition for heavy weapons support?
In the next fight, the Japanese may not necessarily be able to achieve much results.
Therefore, the offensive against the Japanese is not difficult to judge and deploy troops. It is not difficult to judge. As long as you look at both sides of the railway line, you can analyze the general deployment of the Japanese army most of the time, especially the heavy troop groups.
The deployment situation. It was like this on the battlefield inside the pass, and it was still like this in the Northeast.
Before the Anti-Japanese Alliance came out, the Kwantung Army, which had been clamoring for a northward march all day long, deployed far more troops in Eastern Manchuria, where the railway density was much higher than in Western Manchuria. This was because their logistical supplies were inseparable from the railways.
Without the railway, they would not be able to fight for a long time. Before this battle, the Kwantung Army's troop deployment was also based on this standard.
The furthest distance of the main heavy force group is no more than 300 kilometers along the railway line. The entire Western Manchuria, from Wangye Temple in the north to Chifeng in the south, only has one and a half divisions. Even though there was a sudden increase before the war,
There is a 51st Division, but the overall strength in depth is quite limited.
In the entire Western Manchuria region, from the south of the Wangye Temple to the Linxi territory, there was almost no Japanese soldier in the vast area. If Yang Zhen had not understood this characteristic of the Japanese army's operations, how would Yang Zhen have mobilized Wang Guangyu's troops to fight away from the rear?
Detour hundreds of kilometers in Outer Mongolia and go straight to Linxi, and hit the waist of the entire Japanese army in Western Manchuria with one fist?
If the Japanese army had the battlefield support capabilities of the US military, or even the battlefield support capabilities of the German army, as well as its rapid maneuverability, Yang Zhen would not dare to take the risk. In the fierce fighting in the north, he would dare to strengthen the infantry division and the cavalry brigade.
, a group of armored brigade dares to break away from the supply line for hundreds of kilometers to break in alone?
Yang Zhen dared to do this because the Japanese army lacked the long-term combat capability away from the railway line. In the vast area south of the Taosuo Railway in Western Manchuria, north of Chifeng, and west of Tongliao, only one division could be guaranteed to fight. If the strength is further
A little more, using the Japanese army's tactics to supplement their capabilities, is okay for a short time, but over time his troops will be hungry.
As long as Wang Guangyu can deal with the 23rd Division in a short period of time, and Chen Hanzhang can penetrate the front line of Tongliao as scheduled, leaving the Kwantung Army with no time to worry about the Linxi battlefield, there will be almost no danger to Wang Guangyu. The Kwantung Army, which lacks trucks,
There is no ability to maintain too many troops far away from the railway line.
As long as the 51st Division is solved, even though the supply line is longer, it can still be considered as opening up the supply to Wang Guangyu. Then use the Xinjing battlefield to hold back part of the Kwantung Army's strength, making it hesitate to adjust its deployment.
It was impossible to mobilize a large number of reinforcements to Western Manchuria in a short period of time. In this way, it was equivalent to laying two wedges in Western Manchuria, which the Japanese army could not swallow nor drive away.
The weakness of the Japanese army's tactical supply capability, which relied too much on railways, was used and exploited to the extreme by Yang Zhen in this battle. For the Kwantung Army, it was also a fatal weakness. Even the 14th Division, which was later transferred to Tongliao,
There is no way to get rid of this factor and not leave the railway line.
In fact, if the 14th Division deploys its main force to Kailu and only deploys one regiment on the Tongliao battlefield, it will have a greater role in coordinating and supporting the Linxi battlefield. Moreover, the terrain there is more conducive to holding on. But Kailu is not accessible
Railway, the Kwantung Army was unable to maintain supplies to the Fourteenth Division for a long time.
Almost all the remaining troops are deployed near the railway lines. Because of the Japanese army's road transportation capabilities, it is difficult to maintain the supplies needed for large corps operations at a distance of more than 250 kilometers away from the railway for a long time. Once it exceeds its own
If they have to carry supplies for a long time and it is difficult to raise supplies locally in an area, the combat effectiveness of the Japanese army will decline very quickly.
Even if food can be requisitioned on the spot, that is, looted, there is no way to replenish ammunition and other supplies. It is with this point of view that Yoshimoto Teiichi believes that the Anti-Japanese War relies entirely on imported fuel for the source of fuel. If the Anti-Japanese War in the West
Maintaining a large number of troops for a long time will make logistical supplies even more difficult to support.
Because in the entire vast area of Western Manchuria, except for the Taosuo Railway in the north, the Zhengtao Railway in Shuangliao, and part of the Tao-Qi Railway that can be used by the Anti-Japanese Alliance, there are no other railway lines in the deep areas of the west that can be used by the Anti-Japanese Alliance.
Use. In the deep area of Western Manchuria, the distance from the railway line is far more than 300 kilometers.
Although the war is over, the supplies of the Anti-Japanese Alliance can be transported directly to Tongliao by railway, but a large number of trucks are needed to go west. Even if the number of trucks is sufficient, the road conditions in Western Manchuria and the reliance on imported oil can satisfy the demand.
Is it necessary for the Anti-Japanese Alliance? Since the Kwantung Army does not yet have this capability, Yoshimoto Teiichi does not believe that the Anti-Japanese Alliance can meet this standard.
The Kwantung Army cannot maintain this situation at all. And Yoshimoto Teiichi, who is accustomed to judging others by himself, believes that his potential for sustained warfare far exceeds that of the Anti-Japanese Alliance. Naturally, he also believes that the sustained combat capability is far inferior to that of their Anti-Japanese Alliance, and he is also unable to do so.
Maintain large corps for long-term operations in Western Manchuria.
The vast territory of Western Manchuria and the poor traffic conditions mean that if a large number of troops are maintained, a large number of trucks will be needed to ensure logistical supplies. This kind of consumption is not only detrimental to the Anti-Japanese Alliance, which has a weak industrial base, but also to Kanto, which has the support of modern industry behind it.
The entire army would be unbearable. Otherwise, the Kwantung Army would not have deployed only one 23rd Division in the entire vast area of Western Manchuria.
Even if the Anti-Japanese Alliance now occupies the entire Western Manchuria, the huge consumption of modern warfare means that they are destined to be unable to deploy a large number of troops in Western Manchuria for a long time. Unless they transfer all their road transportation forces to Western Manchuria. But if this is the case, they will
You will also be overwhelmed by the huge fuel consumption.
What's more, as long as the Kwantung Army can replenish a sufficient number of aircraft, restore the vitality of the aviation force, and defend the Lishu line, then the Zhengtao Railway and the Dazheng Railway, which are very close to Lishu and serve as an important part of the Anti-Union West Manchuria transportation line, will
The connecting section with the Zhengtao Railway is also within the fire control range of the Kwantung Army at any time.
As long as the Kwantung Army is willing, it can cut off this railway line at any time. Without this railway line, whether the existing transportation capacity of the Anti-Japanese Alliance can guarantee basic consumption is a question. Yoshimoto Sadichi does not believe that the Anti-Japanese War will
The Lianhe had the strength to be able to meet the needs of a large number of garrison troops in Western Manchuria by relying solely on road transportation. In his opinion, it might be possible in the short term, but over time the threat to the Liantian would be the most fatal.