Chen Hanzhang wanted to stop quickly and concentrate superior firepower in the shortest time to deal with the 118th Division first, but the main reason why Yang Zhen disagreed with him was that in Yang Zhen's view, the entire Lu
Given the situation in the northwest, this would be too risky a move.
Even if his movements are fast, it is still a division of the Japanese army. Even if this division is a so-called security division with two brigades, it is a fully integrated division after all. Even the artillery of this division, etc.
The equipment is not as good as those of the divisions organized by the veteran three regiments.
But this division cannot be completely solved within more than ten hours. Especially when the location of the 118th Division is not too prominent, and the number of troops it can mobilize is quite limited,
It was difficult for him to end the battle before Japanese reinforcements arrived.
Judging from the number of troops Chen Hanzhang mobilized, even if he added the two brigades of the Guantao-line Hebei-Shandong-Henan Military Region, he did not have an absolute advantage in strength. If the troops that needed reinforcements were excluded, they could be directly used to encircle and annihilate the 118th Division.
The strength of the regiment can only reach a ratio of one to one at most.
This undoubtedly compromised his plan for a quick victory to a great extent. Relying on the advantage of firepower will indeed speed up combat operations in the terrain of northwest Shandong. But for an army like the Japanese army, the firepower disadvantage
Advantages are not the decisive factor in solving problems.
Once the war is delayed, the surrounding Japanese troops will quickly encircle them, and the situation will take a turn for the worse. He wants to solve the 118th Division in a short time, but the rest of the surrounding Japanese troops will move too slowly than him when necessary.
?
Especially in the battlefields of southern Hebei and northwest Shandong, where the distance is so close, once the problem cannot be solved before the surrounding Japanese troops counterattack, it means that the tiger will not succeed and will suffer instead. After some consideration, Yang Zhen
In the end, Chen Hanzhang's plan was not approved.
In Yang Zhen's telegram to Chen Hanzhang, he repeatedly warned him to stay calm. The current performance of the 72nd Division is definitely not an isolated action, and there must be something else hidden in it. Judging from the entire battlefield situation in northwest Shandong,
Any action taken by the Japanese army cannot be regarded as isolated.
It is not yet clear why the 72nd Division put up such a formation. We must be careful that if they attack the 118th Division first, they might fall into the trap of the Japanese army. Current combat arrangements
Do not act hastily, but focus on stability. It is not impossible to attack the 118th Division first, but it is not possible at the moment, and the fighter opportunities have not yet reached the most advantageous time.
At least on the surface, the distance between the 118th Division and the 72nd Division is still not large enough, and the 72nd Division's distance to the north is not far enough. If you are really determined to fight the 118th Division
regiment, then we still have to find a way to widen the distance between it and the 72nd Division as much as possible.
And the abnormal actions of the 118th Division on the battlefield in northwest Shandong were really eager to open up the connection with the battlefield in southern Hebei? Or was the Japanese army consciously throwing out bait and using the 118th Division to stir up trouble on the eastern front?
The entire force deployment system? Even luring the Eastern Front troops out of their ready-made positions in order to create fighter opportunities for them?
Under the current situation that has not been truly identified, any risky action is not rational. Actions that are too hasty will only give the Japanese army an opportunity to mobilize their own forces. Let your nose be led by the Japanese army, and you will be
The Japanese army opened up gaps in its troop deployment and created opportunities for the Japanese army.
The Eastern Front Cluster is the top priority of this battle. You must be calm when making any determination. That is, do not follow the Japanese army's baton, let alone be fooled by the illusion created by the Japanese army. The current situation on the battlefield in northwest Shandong is far from clear.
It's not yet time to make a final decision. Don't always think about a quick victory, but have enough patience to fight the Japanese army.
However, Yang Zhen also requested that Chen Hanzhang must pay close attention to the next move of the 72nd Division. Hou Guozhong, who is in charge of the battlefield in northwest Shandong, must keep a close eye on the 72nd Division. This 72nd Division, not
If I just stay on the front line of Qingliang River honestly like this, there will definitely be follow-up actions.
No matter which direction the 118th Division attacks next, the 72nd Division, which is closest to the division, will definitely cooperate. Waiting and waiting, it may not be a bad choice in many cases. But on the Guantao front line,
We must not let down our guard. The next move of the 118th Division is also extremely worthy of vigilance.
After the telegram to Chen Hanzhang was sent, Yang Zhen's eyes were fixed on the northwest Shandong battlefield and the southern Hebei battlefield, two adjacent battlefields on the map. He kept thinking in his mind about the current posture of the Japanese army.
, what kind of idea is it?
The offensive of the 118th Division in northwest Shandong is closely related to the two divisions currently fighting the main force of the Hebei-Shandong-Henan Military Region on the southern Hebei battlefield from Quzhou to Anwu, as well as the battle between the 72nd Division on both sides of the Qingliang River.
What kind of connection is there between the two operations? With the Japanese army assuming such a posture on the battlefield in northwest Shandong, what will be the next action goal?
The red and blue pencil in Yang Zhen's hand drew a line between northwest Shandong and southern Hebei on the map. Several circles were drawn around Quzhou, Jize, and Pingxiang. The terrain of Yongnian is complex.
, surrounded by dense water nets, it is quite easy to defend and difficult to attack. At first, the Hebei, Shandong and Yu Military Region spent a lot of effort to capture Yongnian, which was defended by less than a few thousand puppet troops and two small groups of Japanese troops.
Although the Japanese army in southern Hebei advanced with two divisions, and also used one force to fight fiercely with the Hebei, Shandong and Yu Military Region in Yongnian, Yongnian was never the main direction of attack. Instead, the Japanese army moved in two directions west of Quzhou and Pinghan Road.
The offensive was extremely fierce. The terrain between Quzhou and Guantao was only flat and there were no large rivers, so it was quite easy to attack but difficult to defend.
Judging from the entire terrain from southern Hebei to northwest Shandong, the actions of the 118th Division in northwest Shandong were simply to open up the connection with the battlefield in southern Hebei? The Japanese army used one division to use favorable terrain and the number of defensive troops.
Under limited circumstances, it is somewhat incredible to open up the connection between two battlefields that are not far apart in a straight line.
And as far as the entire battle situation is concerned, it is completely unnecessary. As long as the Japanese army in southern Hebei breaks through the Quzhou line, it is equivalent to advancing hand in hand with the two divisions in the northwest Shandong battlefield. Moreover, the Japanese army has now captured the entire northwest Shandong, and its battle situation
It has no practical significance.
Judging from the troops invested by the Japanese army on the Jinpu and Pinghan lines, their offensive on the Pinghan line is mainly to contain their Western Group. The focus of their attacks has always been along the Jinpu Road. But the Japanese army is currently
What is the intention of doing this? Evenly distributing troops on the front line is a taboo for military strategists, and the Japanese generals will not fail to understand this truth.
Moreover, after the previous stage of the battle, the Japanese army should understand that the current North China battlefield is not the North China battlefield in 1937. It has long been impossible for them to dare to break into the situation alone as a regiment. But it has long been impossible. But
Why do they still deploy like this?
If the actions of the 118th Division in northwestern Shandong were just a false shot, the real target was not Guantao in the west, but Qinghe and Wei County in the north, so that would make sense. But the Japanese army attacked Guantao first.
, but it’s a big circle again. Attacking from Linqing to Qinghe is more powerful than attacking from Guantao, both in terms of distance and terrain.
Although Qinghe is at the deployment node of the two major clusters in the east and west of the Anti-Japanese Alliance, it definitely does not require the Japanese army to go to such great lengths to make such a large circle from the Guantao line. The deployment of the Japanese army in northwest Shandong is such a strange thing.
Yang Zhen was very puzzled by his posture, using a division as a partial division. This obviously went against the conventional approach.
The red and blue pencils in Yang Zhen's hand slowly extended from southern Hebei to eastern Henan. From Anyang, Tangyin, Jixian, to Kaifeng on the south bank of the Yellow River, he carefully weighed the deployment of the Japanese army in eastern Henan, but found nothing
What's unusual about eastern Henan. But when the red and blue pencil in Yang Zhen's hand made a circle from eastern Henan to northern Henan, he found that he had been ignoring one direction, which was the battlefield in southeastern Shanxi.
Is there any connection between the Japanese army's such a situation on the battlefield in northwest Shandong and the actions of the Japanese army on the battlefields in northern Henan, southern Hebei, and southeastern Shanxi? Strategically speaking, with the actions of the Japanese army on the battlefield in southeastern Shanxi,
Is it a kind of coordination? Could it be that the two battlefields echo each other strategically to disrupt the deployment of their entire force?
Judging from the telegrams sent by the Shanxi-Hebei-Luyu Military Region, the two divisions of the Japanese army deployed on the battlefield in southeastern Shanxi moved extremely quickly and had very clear goals. A division that launched the attack from Jincheng was very close to Shanxi.
It was as if the Sui Army troops had not been seen. For the Jin-Sui Army defense area west of Jincheng, not even the security troops were released.
Even along the Qingze Highway behind these two divisions, they did not put any security troops to protect their supply lines. Instead, they concentrated all their forces along both sides of the Dan River, using the Qingze Highway as the main offensive route, and headed directly towards
They rushed in the direction of Changzhi and hit hard.
Although restricted by the terrain restrictions of the Taihang Mountains in southeastern Shanxi, the Japanese army could not hug the entire division into a group, or advance several divisions together and adopt the iron-rolling tactic to push forward in a straight line, as they did on the battlefields in northern Henan and northwest Shandong. Instead, they adopted multiple
They used road-based assaults and marched hand in hand, but the strength of the Japanese troops on each route was more than one regiment. Moreover, the distance between the various Japanese troops was kept as narrow as possible.
The Japanese army put on such a posture on the battlefield in southeastern Shanxi. The two divisions were advancing side by side across the Dan River, which was very shallow and could be easily crossed. This made the Shanxi-Hebei-Luyu Military Region want to take advantage of Shanxi during the movement.
Due to the favorable terrain in the southeast, the idea of concentrating superior forces to annihilate one part of the enemy failed.
On the battlefield east of the Dan River, although two columns and another brigade were also concentrated, a mobile ambush strategy was adopted south of Lu Village in Lingchuan, and a Japanese regiment covering the right flank was surrounded.
The brigade's troops deployed westward along the Dan River to contain the main force of the Japanese army in the unit, so that the main force could encircle and annihilate the regiment south of Lu Village.
However, the speed of the Japanese reinforcements around it was far beyond imagination. Although under the fire cover of three artillery battalions and relying on the condescending terrain, they killed half of the Japanese troops in the unit after several attacks.
The Japanese troops that were quickly outflanked by two other surrounding groups had no choice but to clear the siege and evacuate under siege.
After this battle, the Japanese army acted more cautiously. When its various units advanced in the direction of Changzhi, they tried their best to adopt front-line push tactics. Except for taking shallow and deep detours when they were blocked, they simply did not
Carry out any deep outflanking tactics.
After breaking through the blocking force in front of them, they did not pursue any pursuit of the withdrawing blocking force, but just launched a desperate attack in the direction of Changzhi. Even though they suffered a heavy loss west of the Dan River, the Japanese army did not take any retaliation, which was extremely rare.
After rescuing the unit, they continued to attack in the north of Changzhi.