That Yamaguchi would make such an inference has a lot to do with the fact that he is very keen on reading "Romance of the Three Kingdoms" and likes to learn "command skills" from it. Among the counselors of the Three Kingdoms, those who are truly national warriors are all good at figuring out people's hearts. In Yamaguchi's concept
, he believes that only commanders who are good at understanding people's hearts can be regarded as "commanders", and Bai Chongxi is undoubtedly the leader in this field among active Chinese senior generals.
Yamaguchi's inference was only half correct, and the calculation of Jin's character traits was indeed part of Bai Chongxi's plan, but this was by no means the whole story.
Studying the personality characteristics of the enemy's top commander, finding his command flaws and making targeted arrangements is one of the qualities that an excellent commander must possess. To achieve this, the improvement of intelligence data is essential.
At least, in that time and space, even if Bai Chongxi had a chance to fight against Jin, he would not be able to make the above arrangement because of the lack of relevant intelligence information from China. In this time and space, at this time, the reason why he was able to make this move
The clever move was attributed to Kong Lingyi. Because Kong Lingyi was able to obtain high-level intelligence from the United States at the first time, Bai Chongxi knew immediately that Truman was extremely dissatisfied with King and wanted to replace him, and he also thought of targeting King's eagerness to make meritorious deeds.
Aim the attack at the U.S. Pacific Fleet.
Facts have proved that Bai Chongxi's arrangement was successful.
Yamaguchi is also considered a great talent, otherwise he would not have been able to judge China's tactical intentions in a very short period of time and immediately asked Koizumi Toshiichiro for the higher intelligence authority of the combined fleet. However, because neither he nor Koizumi knew that Jin was "eager for quick success and instant benefit"
"The real reason is that it is destined that they will never be able to obtain higher command authority of the US Pacific Fleet from the Americans.
Only the right medicine will be effective. If you don't know what the disease is, but you use medicine indiscriminately, the result is likely to be counterproductive. Jiwan was attacked, and a large amount of supplies and fuel stored in it were burned. This was also a heavy blow to Koizumi, because he knew
, that is, the U.S.-Japanese combined fleet can completely suppress the Chinese Pacific Fleet, but because the supplies cannot keep up, it means that the combined fleet cannot turn the hope of victory into numerous fruits in a short period of time, and his idea of supporting the mainland at a high speed is inevitable.
Unable to realize it, on the day he received the Yamaguchi telegram, he personally drafted the telegram and urged the communications department to send it to Washington immediately. In the telegram, he bluntly proposed to Truman that the reason why the Pacific Raiders had the potential to win but not achieved victory at all was that
The reason lies in the uncoordinated command of the Combined Fleet, which requires the US government to give the Combined Command higher command authority, saying that this is the only way to ensure that the Pacific Strategy can meet pre-war expectations. At the end of the telegram, he pointed out more implicitly
, the reason why the Combined Fleet has made no achievements during this period has a lot to do with Jin's arbitrary behavior, and the analysis made by the Japanese staff department based on the existing data shows that Commander Jin's command characteristics and personality traits have been studied by the Chinese side
Thoroughly, that’s why a few days ago, the US Pacific Fleet became China’s priority attack target. If the combined fleet does not make corrections in its command, such an incident will happen again...
A very bad diplomatic cable.
Whether Koizumi Minichiro's telegram was polished by his staff and civilian staff is an unsolvable mystery in later research on related historical topics. Most military historians of later generations believe that, given Koizumi's status at the time,
status, his telegram must have been polished or even modified by his subordinates, and based on this, it was concluded that what Koizumi made was not a common sense mistake, but that he did not realize how big the so-called US-Japan alliance was at that time.
Fragile, and even extreme, simply believe that Koizumi's telegram "contributed most" to the defeat of the United States and Japan in the Second Pacific War. It made the already weak US-Japan alliance even more fragile.
Moreover, a barrier was created between Yamaguchi and Jin Zhijian, making the two people who were already wary of each other even more antagonistic.
Yes, the real situation at that time was that US President Truman was indeed very dissatisfied with King's performance and wanted to replace him. However, this did not mean that Koizumi was qualified to make irresponsible remarks on King's command or even his character. After all, In the hearts of Truman and even all Americans, no matter how bad or incompetent King was, he was still their child. They could beat and scold him arbitrarily, but they would never allow others to bully him. As far as Truman was in the situation at that time, because of the difficulty of the South American war, At that time, opposition to war with China was rising in the United States, and he had already regretted his alliance with Japan. Koizumi's sending this telegram again was tantamount to adding fuel to the fire.
"A telegram caused greater cracks in the already fragile alliance between the United States and Japan. It is conceivable that as the actual executors of the US-Japanese military alliance at that time, this would bring great consequences to Commander Kim and Commander Yamaguchi. What a bad influence." This was a comment made by a well-known military historian of later generations on this "telegraph incident" in a book he wrote on the study of the Second Pacific War.
A very objective evaluation.
As a veteran general of the U.S. Navy, King was by no means alone in the country, so even if Truman concealed the news of this telegram for the sake of the overall situation, he would have obtained relevant information through other channels. It was probably with this in mind that Truman did not tell him Concealing the information in the telegram, and maybe even thinking that this was an opportunity to motivate King and the U.S. Pacific Fleet, he forwarded most of the contents of the telegram to King and asked King and his officers to cheer up and use practical methods. Action to prove the Japanese were wrong: "I, and everyone on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, we all believe that you and your subordinates are worthy of our trust, so we are willing to give the Pacific Fleet our greatest support as always..."
For later generations of historians, this is another interesting piece of historical information.
Historically, this secret was declassified about ten years later than the "Telegram Incident" created by Koizumi. This time gap prevented the images of Truman and King from being negatively affected at all in the "Telegraph Incident" and even the Second Pacific War. Because of its influence, it has always been outstanding.
Of course, none of this has anything to do with winning.
The atmosphere in the US-Japanese Combined Fleet Joint Command began to become more subtle due to the two telegrams. Chen Ce and Bai Chongxi did not know about this. At this time, in the hearts of Chen Ce and Bai Chongxi, they still regarded their own side as the dominant force. Weak, so the strategy they implemented was still to weaken the US-Japan combined fleet.