Starting from Turpan, the Ming army once again divided into two groups. The northern group launched an attack on the Dihua Pass. The southern group went west deep into southern Xinjiang, along the southern foothills of the Tianshan Mountains and the north of the Taklimakan Desert, and drove straight into the Bayingoleng area.
In front of the south road is an oasis belt with a vast plain. A thousand kilometers from here to the west, it is basically a vast plain with a vast plain, which is very suitable for the rapid advancement of mechanized corps. Moreover, the width of the battlefield is also very large, from the Tianshan Mountains in the north to the Tianshan Mountains in the south.
The desert, about 120-150 kilometers wide in the middle, is an oasis area with rich water and grass, which is the main residential area in southern Xinjiang. This area of more than 100 kilometers wide is suitable for the army to advance. In the direction of
In Xiaoqiang's opinion, the current battlefield environment in southern Xinjiang is very similar to the North African battlefield in World War II. They are all fighting along the edge of the vast desert. Moreover, the southern Xinjiang battlefield has more benefits for the attackers than the North African battlefield - in the North African battlefield
, the place suitable for fighting at the northern edge of the Sahara Desert is only a few dozen kilometers wide, while the northern edge of the desert here is more than a hundred kilometers wide, making it easy to attack and difficult to defend.
Facts have proved that northern Xinjiang is much more difficult to conquer than southern Xinjiang. First of all, northern Xinjiang is difficult to penetrate. Because if you want to enter northern Xinjiang from Turpan, you must first break through the Tianshan Pass in Dihua. Dihua can historically become the capital of both Xinjiang.
, its strategic position guarding the transportation arteries between the northern and southern Xinjiangs was a decisive factor. After the Soviet army occupied the two Xinjiangs, they naturally paid great attention to the defense construction here. They built a defensive belt at the Tianshan Pass and poured a large
Concrete fortifications, large and small, are Yongbei's strategic military projects. The Ming Army's North Road offensive was directly stuck here, and it was impossible to penetrate at all for a while.
Of course, the Ming Army High Command also took this situation into consideration when formulating the spring general offensive. At that time, a backup plan was formulated, which was to attack northern Xinjiang in two ways.
Entering Northern Xinjiang is not only the Dihua road, but also the east passage. The east passage is from the north of Hami into Northern Xinjiang. The north of Hami is next to a small mountain range: Barkol Mountain. This mountain range
It is an extension of the easternmost part of the Tianshan Mountains. To the north of the Barkol Mountains is a plain area of about 130 kilometers, and further north is the Altai Mountains. The administrative dividing line between Northern Xinjiang and Outer Mongolia also passes here.
This 130-kilometer-wide plain area in the middle of the mountain system is another passage into northern Xinjiang. You can go all the way into northern Xinjiang and go deep into the Jungar Basin without any obstacles.
But there is no road in this passage. The only road into northern Xinjiang is through the Tianshan Pass and take the road in Dihua. The Ming army attacked the Tianshan Pass for three days and found that it was really not possible to defeat it in a short period of time.
, so without too much delay, a backup plan was immediately launched, and five divisions were transferred from the north of Hami into northern Xinjiang.
At this point, the offensive to regain the two frontiers became three-way: the south road, the middle road and the north road. The south road attacked the southern Xinjiang, and the middle road and the north road attacked the northern Xinjiang.
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The Soviet Union obviously paid more attention to northern Xinjiang. Not only was northern Xinjiang more fertile, but it was also closer to Russia and the Trans-Siberian Railway in the north, making it easier to control. Therefore, the main force of the Soviet troops stationed in Xinjiang was in northern Xinjiang.
Among the divisions, three were People's Guard Armored Divisions. As soon as these three armored divisions reached the north of Barkol Mountain, they were ambushed by four Soviet armored divisions. The Soviet army adopted the tactics commonly used by the Ming army, attacking from the left and right.
The two-wing pincer offensive almost surrounded the forward division. The Ming army suffered heavy losses in this battle, losing almost 300 tanks, and was defeated until it retreated to Hami.
The Ming Army's North Road offensive also advanced rapidly this time. In addition, they had not suffered many defeats since the beginning of the offensive. They advanced triumphantly all the way to Turpan, especially after passing Hami. They were so unstoppable that almost everyone in the army became proud.
The soldiers were so strong that even the division commanders did not take the Soviet army seriously. This time the five division commanders rushed in and did not cover the two wings properly. They made a big mistake and were severely beaten by the Soviet commander.
This was the first major defeat the Ming army had suffered since their spring offensive. The entire army was forced into a cold water, and they were immediately alert. The arrogance and arrogance they had had before suddenly subsided.
Soon, the People's Guard received information that the Soviet commander in this battle was Tukhachevsky. This was under the direct command of the commander-in-chief of the Soviet troops stationed in Xinjiang.
After a series of disastrous defeats by the generals below, the Soviet army almost reached its lowest ebb. This time, Marshal Tukhachevsky personally scored a victory over the Ming army. The morale of the Soviet army suddenly doubled, especially the armored troops.
The love and admiration for Tukhachevsky has reached its peak. Whenever Tukhachevsky showed up on the front line during his inspection, the Soviet officers and soldiers immediately cheered like a mountain and a tsunami. What's more, many troops
All the officers and soldiers shouted "Long live Comrade Tukhachevsky".
Comrade Tukhachevsky previously led them to liberate Northern Xinjiang at lightning speed and expel Ming imperialism, and now he led them again to repel the counterattack of Ming imperialism. Tukhachevsky became the hero of the Soviet officers and soldiers.
God of War. At least in the army, after Stalin, Tukhachevsky is now considered the second most admired person. - In the armored force, Tukhachevsky's status in the hearts of the officers and soldiers has even been
above Stalin.
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In southern Xinjiang, the Ming Army's southern offensive was a success. As before, the offensive went smoothly and won every victory. The flat and open terrain, roads, continuous oases, and the Soviet army's southern Xinjiang garrison were not many. They were mainly used to suppress resistance.
, there are not many armored troops. This has become a good condition for the Ming army to attack.
There is another very important difference between southern Xinjiang and northern Xinjiang. Northern Xinjiang is basically a pastoral area, and the main ethnic group is Kazakh. They live a nomadic life of living in pursuit of water and grass, and the grassroots social structure is relatively loose. However, southern Xinjiang is basically a farming area, and the main ethnic group is Kazakh.
The ethnic group is Uighur, and most of them live a settled life of farming, and the grassroots social structure is relatively stable. Whether it is the collective commune policy before the Soviet Union or the current "hunger weapon", it is more destructive in farming areas than in pastoral areas.
Much larger. Therefore, the resistance in southern Xinjiang has always been more intense than in northern Xinjiang.
Now that the Ming army is attacking, large-scale riots are happening in various places. Wherever the Ming army goes, the first thing the local Soviet army has to deal with is not to resist the Ming army, but to suppress the riots. Of course, the Soviet army has guns and artillery, but the common people are not them
opponent. But in this way, the Soviet army basically had no chance to prepare for the attack. At least it could not deploy troops according to military defense, but had to deploy troops according to the riot areas. The defensive plan was completely disrupted.
Northern Xinjiang and southern Xinjiang are separated by the high Tianshan Mountains, making it difficult to mobilize troops to each other. The Soviet army could only mobilize thousands of miles from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan in the rear, which had to span the entire southern Xinjiang. The journey was long and there were no railways.
Using roads to transport troops, the Soviet army's vehicle transport capacity was far inferior to that of the Ming army. Therefore, in a short period of time, the Soviet army in southern Xinjiang was in a very isolated situation.
From June 7 to June 19, the Ming Army's South Road Offensive advanced 600 kilometers in 12 days, from Turpan across Bayingoleng and into the oasis corridor north of the Aksu Taklimakan Desert.