The next time was for group discussions to review the "Institutional Reform Draft", the "Senate Discipline Regulations Draft" and the "Law on Relations with Naturalized Citizens and Naturalized Citizens". Members of the Law Society and some professional elders who participated in drafting the documents
Go around each group to explain relevant provisions and record questions that cannot be answered.
It can be said that these three bills are closely related to the vital interests of the elders, and the discussion was relatively lively. During the discussion, some people raised the question that the Ministry of People's Security controls three powerful departments, and the leader is equivalent to controlling all the internal security forces. Will this cause
Threat to the Senate?
"This kind of worry is completely unnecessary." Ma Jia explained, "If we look at the scope of jurisdiction, the powers of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Public Security of China and the Public Security Commission of Japan, which we are most familiar with, are almost the same - or even longer.
Larger. But in actual operation, they did not threaten their respective political systems. What's more, the National Army is under the dual leadership of the Ministry of Armed Forces and the Ministry of People's Security. It is definitely not the final say."
As for whether the Armed Forces Province's inclusion of the army and navy violates the separation of military and government orders, Dongmen Chuiyu's explanation is that according to the new system, the People's Commissar of the Armed Forces Province will be a civilian veteran, and his status is equivalent to the Minister of Defense. His subordinates
The Ministry of the Army and the Ministry of the Navy belong to the military and political system; the Chief of Army Staff and the Minister of Naval Command under the Chief of General Staff are the military order system. The military order system is directly under the Chairman of the Senate, and any order involving military mobilization and combat command needs to be issued by the Chairman of the Senate.
, it will take effect only after it is signed and communicated by the People's Commissar of the Armed Forces.
Regarding the suggestion by some elders that every elder should "play a part" in the army to safeguard the "legitimate rights and interests" of elders, Dongmen Chuiyu's answer is this:
"TgExcept for the General Secretary of the Party who is also the Chairman of the Military Commission, most members of the Central Committee and the Politburo have no military positions, no military ranks, and do not need any military officers to be personally loyal to them to ensure their political power; the Central Guard Bureau is not their
Personal private soldiers. In the same way. Most of the countries in the world that are politically normal, including the former Soviet Union, the United States, Russia, Britain, France, Germany, etc.... have no politicians who rely on the personal loyalty of military officers or the maintenance of private soldiers to maintain democracy.
's approach. Even the Junker nobles who have always controlled the army. The army is loyal to a collective, not to him personally. Whether he is a marshal or a second lieutenant, he will be just a reservist when he retires and returns home. As long as we always insist on the Senate commanding the gun,
Instead of someone directing the gun, there will not and cannot be a so-called 'dictatorship'...
"Feudal dependence must not and should not be practiced in the Senate. No matter it is called retainer, retainer, retainer or some other patronage system of the British Empire, it is essentially the remnant of feudal personal dependence. Such things will eventually happen one day
Something is wrong! What has been swept into the dustbin of history cannot be picked up and put on your head just because it is replaced with a beautiful shell so-called 'protecting the power of the elders'."
In his heart, Dongmen Chuiyu is very disgusted with the arguments of "carving up the army" and "officers must be loyal to individual veterans". Not only himself, but also the vast majority of veteran officers in the Fubo Army are strongly opposed to this.
attitude. Regardless of whether they are from pla or military backgrounds, they all agree with the concept of the national army. In their view, once the personal loyalty of officers is established in the army, it is equivalent to forming a situation of one servant and two masters in the army, which is extremely serious.
To undermine the authority of the Fubo Army's command system.
What worries them even more is that most of the self-proclaimed elders who are paranoid about being persecuted are not capable of controlling the army on their own, and will inevitably use so-called power tactics to win over the naturalized civilian officers. And the so-called power tactics are nothing more than equal emphasis on kindness and power.
Power, that's hard to say. Most of the elders are neither the founders nor the commanders of the army, and they have never fought with the army. I want a stranger, a naturalized civilian officer, to have any personal influence on him.
It is difficult to achieve awe from the heart - then it is indispensable to use a large number of "rewards" to "show favors" in order to gain their "loyalty". In order to consolidate this "loyalty", most of them will start a fight among the elders.
compete.
This will first destroy the army's military order system. In order to win people's hearts, the elders will inevitably interfere with the army's rank promotion, job transfer, salary and benefits, etc.; the naturalized civilian officers will soon take advantage of the elders' expectations and rely on the elders.
They use the power of "master" to resist the orders of their superiors and violate the system to seek their own greater interests. Over time, the most important absolute obedience and cohesion between superiors and subordinates in the army will be completely destroyed. When will the elders benevolent again?
It cannot satisfy their appetite. The lessons of the Roman Empire and the Turkish Guards are not far away.
"When these 'loyal' officers lead their troops to the gate of the Senate and demand more 'grace', otherwise they will support a certain senator as emperor, the senators will know how conducive to democracy this system is." Dong Dong
Menchuiyu complained in private.
But he couldn't say these things: many elders still have "rose-colored fantasies" about their "leadership skills" and have a strong admiration for Long Aotian's "acquisition of subordinates" model. They feel that as long as they are naturalized
The people are loyal to him personally, that is, an NPC with a loyalty of 99% wherever he fights. Even if the loyalty sometimes drops, giving more rewards can quickly increase the loyalty... Those who break this illusion will be hated by others.
.
"Finally, most of the elders are sensible..." Dongmen Chuiyu thought, "Otherwise, the world would really be in chaos."
"Old Ma, since we have veteran discipline, the work of the Discipline Inspection Commission must be managed by our Cheka. Our department has been fighting on the front line of anti-corruption. We have a lot of experience and professionalism..." Yifan grabbed his waistcoat.
, almost speaking in a pleading tone.
"You really want to be hated by others." Ma Jia laughed.
"For the great cause of the Senate, I don't care about my personal honor or disgrace." Yifan said with awe-inspiring righteousness.
"The functions of the Cheka have not been fully determined yet," Ma Jia said, "but you can rest assured that the anti-corruption of naturalized civilian cadres will definitely be handled by your department. As for whether it can control the Discipline Inspection Commission, I'm afraid we still have to discuss it...
"
"Don't worry, if you want to benefit the life and death of the country, how can you avoid misfortunes and blessings! I will do my best until I die." Yifan patted his chest to express his determination. He was thinking about whether to reveal clues to several major corruption cases.
In the end, I decided that it was better not to say anything for the time being - when the authority fell to me, it would be too late to say anything.
Some people also have objections to certain clauses in the disciplinary regulations, such as the issue of doing business and making donations. It is understandable that when doing business, this is to open an opening for the family members of the elders. However, the donation clause does not specify whether the family members of the elders can accept the donation.
Regulations, some people have suggested that they should be explicitly prohibited:
"Contribution itself is a backward and even harmful phenomenon. It should be completely prohibited at the legal level."
"It is very easy to ban all donations from a legal perspective," Yu Eshui said, "or add it in. But one clause cannot solve all the problems, because most donations are carried out through normal buying and selling procedures, and it can be done
It has to be legal. If you want to prevent the slightest corruption, it is best to ban even the family members of the elders from doing business."
"It would be too difficult to prohibit family members of senators from doing business." Ma Jia expressed doubts. "First, the senators themselves have such needs; secondly, family members of senators must also have a decent way out. It is not necessarily possible for everyone to join politics or the military.
Not everyone has the ability to be a cadre or technician or scientist."
Jin Zhijiao, who works in the Cheka, expressed her opinion: "I have read some materials written by the curator, and the main purpose of donating them is to avoid taxes. We only need to ensure that the collection is reasonable and not unaffordable; and everyone is treated equally, no matter who owns the enterprise.
Or land, you have to pay taxes according to regulations, and it becomes unprofitable and risky to donate, so naturally no one will do it."
"No, it's not that simple. In addition to tax avoidance, the motivation for donation is also the motivation for obtaining asylum. This asylum has two meanings. One is to avoid public and private harassment-this can be done after we complete social transformation.
Generally guaranteed; on the other hand, the power and influence of the elders can also be used to strive for more benefits. This is probably something we cannot completely avoid." Ma Jia said, "The phenomenon of dedication is not a problem even in China in the 21st century.
It exists in a modified form, and if we cannot restrict it from the system, just banning it in the form of a disciplinary clause is of little use."
How to impose institutional restrictions? Ma Jia’s view is that the influence of senators on administrative agencies must be reduced. In his view, this is the most obvious advantage of taking shelter from the senators - but this is also the most difficult to achieve, and it can even be said that
It’s impossible to do. The administrative machinery of the Senate relies almost entirely on the leadership of the senators to function normally. Currently, it is clearly written in the disciplinary provisions of the senators that senators are not allowed to interfere with administrative procedures by “writing notes” or “saying hello”
, and stipulates that all instructions from the senators must be archived in writing. But he has doubts about how effective it will be.
According to the thinking of the Law Society, it is inevitable that elders have great influence in their own departments and units, and it must be tolerated at this stage. The focus is on preventing the "cross-departmental" influence of elders. Especially on naturalized civilian cadres
The influence of the Law Society. For this reason, the Law Society put forward an important argument, that is, the Senate must follow the example of the emperor and create the impression among the naturalized people and indigenous people that "life and death, honor and disgrace are all due to God's grace". Specifically, everything has a positive impact on the naturalized people and indigenous people.
The rewards and punishments of civilized cadres must be emphasized as coming from the collective "senator" rather than a single senator. Through disciplinary regulations, senators are strictly prohibited from intervening across departments. (To be continued.)